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DISCRIMINATION ON WHEELS:
HOW BIG DATA USES LICENSE
PLATE SURVEILLANCE TO PUT THE
BRAKES ON DISADVANTAGED
DRIVERS
Nicole K. McConlogue*
As scholarly discourse increasingly raises concerns about the negative societal effects of “fintech,” “dirty data,” and “technochauvinism,” a growing technology provides an instructive illustration of all three of these problems. Surveillance
software companies are using automated license plate reader (ALPR) technology
to develop predictive analytical tools. In turn, software companies market those
tools to auto financers and insurers as a risk assessment input to evaluate consumers seeking to buy a car. Proponents of this technology might argue that more information about consumer travel habits will result in more accurate and individualized risk predictions, potentially increasing vehicle ownership among
marginalized groups. Expanding access to cars would go a long way toward undoing the economic suppression of many people who are low-income or of color.
However, discrimination in the consumer scoring cycle shows that ALPR-based
data analytics will only exacerbate the economic and racial disparities in car ownership. Competing incentives and biased assumptions steer the choices of the humans who collect ALPR data, creating a conflict that irredeemably poisons the
data and any consumer access decisions that spring from it. Moreover, using location data to assess risk means that automobile costs may be based on value judgments about the neighborhoods that consumers visit. Thus, rather than creating an
equal path to economic mobility, the tainted ALPR data collection methodology
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reinforces discrimination. Not only that, but using the data to score consumers
risks resuscitating and repackaging the practice of redlining.
This article analyzes the fintech model as represented by the use of ALPR technology in auto financing and insurance. Existing commentary surrounding ALPR has
focused on ALPR’s privacy and Fourth Amendment implications. While scholars
and commentators have been busy examining law enforcement’s engagement with
this high-tech surveillance technology, powerful private actors have flown under
the radar while subjecting vulnerable consumers to ALPR’s exploitative commercial applications. This article deviates from prior commentary by contemplating
ALPR through a consumer law lens. It exposes the ways in which consumer laws
have left disadvantaged drivers unprotected. Finally, it advances a number of proposals, including removing geographic inputs from auto access decision making,
developing a central base of technological expertise to audit algorithms, and banning commercial use of ALPR.
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INTRODUCTION
Lena was leaving the Pasadena restaurant where she had been celebrating
her mother’s birthday.1 “Lizzy” was driving from Los Angeles to her sister’s
home in the desert to drop off some medicine.2 Before they knew it, they were
both involved in frightening police encounters. Lena was ordered from her car,
and the police seized her vehicle; Lizzy was held at gunpoint.3
What did these women have in common? They had both attended a Black
Lives Matter protest in Long Beach six weeks prior. Police had flagged their cars
because they were parked near a looting site.4 The technology that pinpointed
them is known as an automated license plate reader (ALPR).5 ALPR cameras
mounted on the roofs of squad cars passively scan all the license plates they encounter and store the data for future use.6 The officer whose camera scanned
Lena and Lizzy’s plates was probably not looking for them, and there is no indication that any direct evidence existed connecting them to the looting activity.7
But because their plates were scanned, they were added to a list of people that
the police could detain, question, and deprive of their property after the fact,
simply because their cars were near the crime scene.8
The tool is widely used to solve crimes and enforce parking restrictions, but
law enforcement departments also use it to track immigrants and Muslims and to
scrutinize low-income communities of color.9 Advocates for privacy and fair policing are sounding the alarm about ALPR technology and are vocally pushing
1. Danielle Berrin, Two Months After Black Lives Matter March, Police Confiscate Cars
of Peaceful Protesters, FORWARD (July 27, 2020), https://forward.com/news/451568/twomonths-after-black-lives-matter-march-police-confiscate-cars-of.
2. Stephen Drowning, LBPD Dragnet Snags the Innocent, BEACHCOMBER (Aug. 7,
2020, 10:26 PM), https://beachcomber.news/content/lbpd-dragnet-snags-innocent.
3. Berrin, supra note 1.
4. Drowning, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO
RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 2 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/other/you-are-beingtracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record-americans-movements.
7. Drowning, supra note 2.
8. Lena’s attorney pointed out that “To impound a vehicle, you have to have probable
cause. So to say, ‘They were in the area near the protests,’ well, anyone could have parked
their car in that area.” Berrin, supra note 1.
9. See Gustavo Solis, Chula Vista Gives Immigration Officials, Others Access to License
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for regulations such as warrant requirements and policies limiting how long police departments can retain the data the technology generates.10
But what if I told you the same technology is also used commercially? What
if I told you that ALPR data could impact what interest you pay for financing
when you trade in your car, or for auto insurance when you renew your policy?
And what if I told you that commercial uses of this technology show the same
propensity for race- and class-based discrimination that ALPR displays in the
hands of the police?
It’s true. ALPR is increasingly ubiquitous nationwide, and the data it produces is finding its way into all kinds of automated decision-making processes
that can impact the financial futures of countless people.11 However, these commercial uses have not inspired the same vehement pushback that law enforcement uses have unleashed. Thus, ALPR data are up for sale, and spreading insidiously because their commercial use flies under consumer advocates’ radar.
ALPR is going viral, and few know that it is happening or what it means.
This Article endeavors to shed light on the dangers of ALPR’s commercial
uses. Automated license plate reader technology has taken its place among other
forms of Big Data, which data brokers fold into predictive analytics programs.
Those programs try to anticipate consumer behavior and “score” consumers’ creditworthiness (for a price!).12 And the race and class of the consumers swept up
in its reach very likely influence the algorithm’s results. Data collectors are financially incentivized to surveil neighborhoods where they think people do not
pay their bills—which means they often disproportionately monitor poor, marginalized communities.13 Once in possession of the data, predictive analytics customers—including auto financers and insurers—may draw biased conclusions
about consumers and, as a result, adjust their prices in a discriminatory manner.
Plate Reader Data, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Dec. 6, 2020, 3:59 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/south-county/chula-vista/story/2020-12-06/chula-vistagives-immigration-officials-others-access-to-license-plate-reader-data; Suhauna Hussain &
Johana Bhuiyan, Police in Pasadena, Long Beach Pledged Not to Send License Plate Data to
ICE. They Shared It Anyway, L. A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2020, 8:27 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-12-21/pasadena-long-beach-police-ice-automated-license-plate-reader-data; Dave Maass & Jeremy Gillula, What You Can
Learn from Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 21, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data.
10. Nathan Tempey, The NYPD Is Tracking Drivers Across the Country Using License
Plate Readers, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 26, 2016, 8:18 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/the-nypdis-tracking-drivers-across-the-country-using-license-plate-readers.
11. See infra Section I.A.1.
12. Id.
13. See infra note 159. Because these are private actors, not the government, the evidence would not be subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, and most verified instances of this lopsided monitoring are related to government action. This Article will discuss
the implications of this secrecy further below. However, the same potential for targeting exists,
and there are fewer, if any, safeguards to prevent it.
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Biased price adjustments, in turn, threaten to entrench long-standing income and
wealth gaps. Ultimately, if auto financers and insurers use inherently biased
ALPR data to score consumers, they risk reviving and reinforcing redlining.14
What’s more, the cheaper and more accessible the technology becomes, the more
areas of our economic lives it will pervade.15
Part I of this Article discusses how ALPR technology works, how it informs
predictive risk analysis tools used by auto insurers and financers, and why some
observers hope that ALPR tools can democratize auto access and counteract the
discriminatory history of auto access and consumer scoring generally. Part II
demonstrates that these hopes are misplaced. Predictive analytics tools use a
range of criteria—including credit scores, payment histories, and past lending
decisions—to assess the risk of investing in a particular consumer. Algorithmic
tools and existing consumer protection laws do not effectively address discrimination’s early entry points in this cycle. Nor do they address the algorithms’ secrecy and reliance on biased actuarial methods.16 Part II also introduces a framework for assessing whether regulatory consumer protections are effective. Part
III offers proposals for tackling these early entry points for discrimination and
interrupting the secretive and actuarial nature of consumer scoring.
I. BACKGROUND
A. ALPR technology and its uses
Automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technology integrates sophisticated software with cameras to passively collect automobile location data.17 As
a car comes within the vicinity of a camera equipped with this software, the camera records the car’s license plate number and the date, time, and location.18 This
14. See Section II.C.2.a.ii.
15. See, e.g., Josh Kaplan, License Plate Readers Are Creeping Into Neighborhoods

Across the Country, SLATE (July 10, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/07/automatic-license-plate-readers-hoa-police-openalpr.html (noting that as ALPR
technology has gotten cheaper, it’s been used by more small town police departments, homeowners’ associations, and property managers); Conor Friedersdorf, Mass Surveillance of All
Car Trips is Nearly Upon Us, ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/mass-surveillance-of-all-car-trips-is-nearly-upon-us/283922 (discussing
the Department of Homeland Security’s plans to build a national license plate reader database—plans the Department later canceled).
16. Actuarial fairness is particularly well-known in the context of insurance. It means
“to classify risk and then allocate cost according to that risk; the riskier pay higher fees or have
fewer benefits than those who are less risky.” This idea is in contrast to the concept of mutual
aid, which is “to simply share that risk equally.” Valarie K. Blake, Ensuring an Underclass:
Stigma in Insurance, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1441, 1448 (2020).
17. DAVID J. ROBERTS & MEGHANN CASANOVA, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1-2
(2012).
18. Id. at 10.

274

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[18:269

data is then banked. Cameras may be mounted on a fixed location—like a roadside or a bridge—or mounted on cars guided by a human driver for mobile data
collection.19
Readers may already be familiar with this technology in the context of toll
roads. ALPR cameras have become ubiquitous at toll plazas to identify wanted
vehicles and send tickets to drivers who pass through the toll lane without paying.20 Law enforcement authorities also use this technology to search for stolen
vehicles and penalize drivers who violate state car insurance requirements.21
The ALPR data landscape in the U.S. is dominated by one company:
Motorola Solutions. Motorola Solutions operates two networks, the Vigilant
LEARN platform and Digital Recognition Network (DRN).22 These networks
provide ALPR software and equipment to their customers, as well as access to
massive data networks which house user-generated data.23 Vigilant LEARN
19. Id. at 2, 9; Friedersdorf, supra note 15.
20. As of 2013, there had been 37 million transponder units issued nationwide for elec-

tronic toll collection. The number of electronic or “cashless” tolls, already on the rise, is only
likely to increase, as human toll booth collectors can serve as vectors for COVID-19. INT’L
BRIDGE, TUNNEL & TPK. ASS’N, 2015 REPORT ON TOLLING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2015),
https://www.ibtta.org/sites/default/files/documents/MAF/2015_FactsInBrief_Final.pdf; see
A-TO-BE, HOW TECHNOLOGY EMPOWERS SMART CITIES: LEARNINGS FROM EUROPE 1-2 (2020),
https://www.ibtta.org/sites/default/files/documents/A-to-Be%20Article%20%20How%20technology%20empowers%20Smart%20Cities%20%28Apr2020%29.pdf; Luz
Lazo, Another Victim of the Coronavirus: Cash Tolls, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2020/08/12/another-victim-coronaviruscash-tolls.
21. ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 17, at 1. All states but New Hampshire and Virginia require auto insurance, or alternatively that the driver place a bond matching the state
minimum in lieu of insurance. Virginia charges uninsured drivers a $500 annual fee. Mila
Araujo, Minimum Car Insurance Requirements by State, BALANCE (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-minimum-car-insurance-requirements-2645473;
Uninsured Motor Vehicle Fee, VA. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.virginia.gov/vehicles/#uninsured_fee.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2021); Insurance Requirements/SR-22, N.H. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/dmv/financial-responsibility/insurance.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
22. Tammy Waitt, Motorola Solutions Acquires Vigilant Solutions’ Parent Company
VaaS, AMERICAN SECURITY TODAY (Jan. 10, 2019), https://americansecuritytoday.com/motorola-solutions-acquires-vigilant-solutions-parent-company-vaas; MOTOROLA
SOLUTIONS, MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE MEMORANDUM 1 (2020),
www.cityofwinters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/VS-MSI-BrandSecurityandComplianceMemorandum-V6-FINAL-051520-Digital.pdf. Per Jack Bernstein,
the CEO of competitor Locator Technologies, as of 2014, DRN served 70% of the commercial
market and Vigilant Solutions (now part of Motorola Solutions) had 90% of the law enforcement market for ALPR. Friedersdorf, supra note 15.
23. Vigilant advertises that “Vigilant PlateSearch empowers your team with patented
analytics and billions of license plate scans from your agency’s own cameras, other departments[sic] cameras, enterprise partners and a nationwide commercial data network to identify,
predict and alert to vehicle sightings.” MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, VIGILANT PLATESEARCH 1
(2020)
https://www.motorolasolutions.com/content/dam/msi/docs/products/license-platerecognition-systems/reaperhd-mobile-lpr-system/vigilant_platesearch_fact_sheet.pdf. DRN
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serves law enforcement authorities, including the federal government. Its past
customers include, for example, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).24
DRN serves the commercial market for ALPR data, in which private actors such
as auto repossessors collect, share, and access license plate scans. Law enforcement agencies that work with Motorola Solutions have access to scans other
agencies have chosen to share, and to DRN’s vast data network—which encompasses over 9 billion license plate scans—in addition to the scans they generate
themselves.25
DRN compiles its data by partnering with towing companies and individual
tow truck drivers who are hired to repossess cars.26 Lenders hire these repossessors to recover vehicles from car owners who are in default. In turn, DRN encourages those same repossessors to sign up as “Affiliates.”27 As Affiliates, repossessors purchase ALPR cameras and scan license plates wherever they drive.
Their scans are then submitted to the DRN network. In return for collecting data
for DRN, the Affiliates can access the network and benefit from scans generated
by other Affiliates to help them locate cars on their bounty list.28 They can upload
“hotlists” of cars they are looking for and get an alert whenever a wanted car is
spotted.29 DRN also offers to connect Affiliates with “Forwarders,” or liaisons
who can connect Affiliates with more lenders and more contracts.30

explains that “Our vast network of license plate recognition cameras feeds an expansive database of vehicle images. Our platform of analytic solutions then uses these images to help detect
fraud, reduce risk and find vehicles with more speed and accuracy than relying solely on public
data.” DRN Solutions, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/solutions (last visited
Mar. 27, 2022); see also Kaplan, supra note 15.
24. ACLU, supra note 6, at 27; Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, Freedom of Information Act Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, to Vasudha Talla, Staff Attorney,
ACLU
of
Northern
Cal.
(July 13,
2017),
67,
72-75,
93
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/DOCS_031319.pdf.
25. How Our Auto Recovery Network Works, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210228024614/https://www.drnrecovery.com/recovery-network (Feb. 28, 2021). Motorola Solutions’ client agencies own the data they generate and
share and retain it according to their individual policies. Susan Crandall, Vigilant Solutions
Bolsters Commercial LPR Database through Agreement with Plate Locate, DIG. RECOGNITION
NETWORK (Apr. 19, 2018), https://drndata.com/vigilant-solutions-bolsters-commercial-lprdatabase-agreement-plate-locate.
26. How Our Auto Recovery Network Works, supra note 25; Repossession, DIG.
RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/repossession/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2022) (confirming that DRN “Affiliates” are car repossessors); Equipment, SPEEDY RECOVERY SERVICES,
https://www.speedyrecoveryinc.com/our-fleet.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2022); DRNsights:
Risk Scoring, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/risk-scoring (last visited
Apr. 12, 2022).
27. There are over 550 Affiliates nationwide. ACLU, supra note 6, at 28.
28. How Our Auto Recovery Network Works, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. Become an Affiliate, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://www.drnrecovery.com/affiliates/become-an-affiliate/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
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1. DRNsights: ALPR repurposed
In addition to repossessors, DRN also markets its data to auto financers and
insurers.31 DRNsights, DRN’s data platform, boasts a menu of proprietary analytics tools it claims can help these entities assess risk and set insurance and interest rates for consumers.32
To financers, DRN pitches DRNsights as a “Risk Scoring service” that provides vehicle location information to help auto financers assess whether they will
be able to recover a car if the borrower slips into default.33 In an auto loan, the
car serves as collateral for the transaction. If the borrower cannot repay the loan
on their car, the lender can repossess and resell the car if necessary. If the lender
is unable to repossess the car, the investment is lost. Thus, the more likely it is
that a lender can recover the car if the borrower falls behind, the less risk there
is to lenders. The less risk there is to lenders, the more loans they can originate—
or so the theory goes. DRN suggests that auto financers use the DRNsights Risk
Scoring analytics tool at the loan origination stage to verify the address of the
trade-in and “evaluate risk.”34 DRN also claims that its data analytics can be employed early in the collection process, if payments are missed, to find the customers and get them to agree to pay, avoiding repossession.35 That way, lenders
can “mitigate risk before it has the opportunity to hurt” them.36 Finally, if the
borrower defaults, the DRN ALPR data can, of course, be used for its original
purpose—to locate and repossess the car.37
31. Let Our Data Tell the Real Story, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2021). A more thorough examination of these two industries and their
practices is available in a later subsection. See Section I.B.
32. Let Our Data Tell the Real Story, supra note 31; DRN Solutions, supra note 23;
DRNsights: Radius Response, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/radius-response (last visited Apr. 12, 2022) (“Radius Response uses billions of license plate detections
to compare vehicle sightings with customer-provided information to optimize premiums and
identify potential fraud.”).
33. DRNsights: Risk Scoring, supra note 26.
34. Id.
35. DRNsights: Skip Trace, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/SKIPTRACE/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
36. DRNsights: Risk Scoring, supra note 26.
37. DRNsights: Vehicle Search, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/VEHICLE-SEARCH/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). Lenders also have the option to
sell and assign the contract to another party, often called a debt buyer. Debt buyers purchase
defaulted debts for pennies on the dollar in order to have the right to collect on the debt for
themselves and profit on the difference between what they paid and what they can collect.
THOMAS KANE ET AL., FTC, THE STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY
ii, 11-12, B-7 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-andpractices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf; LISA STIFLER & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR.
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, DEBT COLLECTION AND DEBT BUYING: THE STATE OF LENDING IN
AMERICA AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 2-3, 6, 9 (2014), https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/11-Debt-Collection.pdf. This is not an ideal solution for lenders, however, as the deeply discounted resale price does not allow the lender to recoup the full
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DRN assures auto insurers that its analytics tools can help them “accurately
rate and price policies.”38 The insurance industry is particularly concerned with
“garage fraud,” in which customers claim a false address (perhaps a former address, or a relative’s address) in order to benefit from lower premiums in that
area compared to the area where the customer actually lives.39 DRN suggests that
insurance companies review the driver’s location history to “optimize premiums” at the policy’s inception and whenever the policy is due to be renewed.40
Notably, DRN does not appear to consider garage fraud to be a dealbreaker for
insurance companies. Instead, it describes these cases as increased risk and suggests that insurers opt to “valu[e] bad risks appropriately for better margins and
profit.”41 This language suggests that DRN anticipates its insurance customers
will use the ALPR data tools to raise prices for these “higher risk” accounts,
rather than reject them outright.
2. Can fintech democratize credit?
Algorithms are like recipes:42 They include a series of prescribed steps that
will yield a desired outcome. As a cook becomes more skilled with experience,
they may begin incorporating slight adaptations into tried-and-true recipes, playing with proportions of ingredients to develop a more refined end product. This
process is analogous to what is commonly known as “machine learning,” a form
of artificial intelligence. A machine learning algorithm continually adjusts itself
based on what it “learns” from the data it has already processed (“training data”)
and the patterns it perceives therein.43 The difference between machine learning
loan investment and may even represent a loss. Thus, reselling the defaulted loan to a debt
buyer may be a last resort.
38. Insurance, DIGITAL RECOGNITION NETWORK, https://drndata.com/insurance/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2021).
39. Auto insurance rates are heavily informed by the customer’s residential address. See
Ashley Kilroy & Jason Metz, 9 Factors That Affect Your Car Insurance Rates, FORBES
(Mar. 10, 2022, 12:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/car-insurance/factors-in-rates.
See generally Ansell Fernandez, Note, Prisoners of the Zip Code: How Single Zip Code RateMaking Hurts the Public Interest, 30 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 120-21 (2018) (arguing that
use of single ZIP code and socioeconomic factors in setting auto insurance rates can lead to
higher premiums for low-income households, more uninsured drivers in low-income communities, and possibly race discrimination).
40. Radius Response, supra note 32.
41. Id.
42. See MICHELE GILMAN, DATA & SOC’Y, POVERTY LAWGORITHMS: A POVERTY
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO FIGHTING AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING HARMS ON LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES 6 (2020), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Poverty-Lawgorithms-20200915.pdf.
43. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV.
671, 680 (2016). Another commentator extends the recipe metaphor by describing machine
learning (or “a learning algorithm”) not as a recipe but as “a procedure for constructing a
recipe.” Suresh Venkat, When an Algorithm Isn’t . . ., MEDIUM (Oct. 1,
2015),http://perma.cc/U7SY-CK7Z.
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and a straight algorithm is that a human can replicate the result a straight algorithm produces. No matter how sophisticated an algorithm is, or how many data
points it processes, if it does not engage in machine learning then a human can
theoretically follow the same formula and arrive at the same result. When an
algorithm engages in machine learning, it is not merely processing the data but
interpreting it. A human, even an experienced programmer, cannot know or replicate the interpretations the algorithm has applied to the available data.44
“Fintech” is a nickname for algorithmic lending, meaning that financial lenders delegate their lending decisions to algorithms.45 Instead of evaluating the consumer directly and making an individual decision regarding the credit risk that
consumer presents, the lender feeds data about the consumer into an algorithm.46
Based on the information provided, the algorithm generates a score that indicates whether the financer should approve the consumer’s application for
credit.47 Algorithms have continually become ever more sophisticated and often
are programmed to engage in machine learning. Moreover, modern machine
learning algorithms can access and process data at a scale that is almost incomprehensibly vast.48
Proponents of fintech argue that it can help democratize lending. Prominent
law and technology scholars Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale, and Jennifer
Chapman point out that “[a]ccording to some futurists, financial markets’ automation will substitute increasingly sophisticated, objective, analytical, model-

44. James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research
Agenda for Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 228 (2019) (“These
algorithms are fed data and then arrive at decisions autonomously, making transparency difficult even if mandatory disclosure were required.”); id. at 259 (quoting Joshua A. Kroll et al.,
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017)) (“Transparency alone is necessary but not sufficient: ‘Machine learning, one increasingly popular approach to automated
decision-making, is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis [i.e., through transparency]
because it involves situations where the decisional rule itself emerges automatically from the
specific data under analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can explain. In this case, source
code alone teaches a reviewer very little, since the code only exposes the machine learning
method used and not the data-driven decision rule.’”).
45. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, Preventing Predation & Encouraging Innovation in
Fintech Lending, 72 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 370, 371 (2018). Fintech has also been defined
as “nondepository financial services firms that integrate artificial intelligence technology and
predictive analytics into their business models.” Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale, & Jennifer
Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 499 n.3 (2019).
46. Johnson, Pasquale, & Chapman, supra note 45, at 500.
47. See generally Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 153–183 (2016) (providing an overview of credit scoring
concepts and methodologies, offering an introduction to the mostly commonly used scoring
tools, and clarifying how machine learning algorithms change the credit scoring landscape).
48. See Timothy A. Asta, Guardians of the Galaxy of Personal Data: Assessing the
Threat of Big Data and Examining Potential Corporate and Governmental Solutions, 5 FLA.
ST. U. L. Rev. 261, 265, 267 (2017).
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based assessments of, for example, a borrower’s creditworthiness for direct human evaluations irrevocably tainted by bias and subject to the cognitive limits of
the human brain.”49 If this were the case, disadvantaged groups would be better
off when they are evaluated by artificial intelligence rather than their fellow humans—who are prone to unfair discrimination.
3. The trouble with consumer scoring
Lenders50 have long shown a tendency to stratify consumers and favor those
considered most desirable. They justify this under the rationale of managing risk
and protecting their investments. Consumers who are more likely to repay the
loan are considered solid investments, and consumers who are more likely to
default are considered riskier investments. To mitigate the risk of nonpayment,
lenders impose more onerous terms upon these less-desirable consumers, such
as raising the interest rate, requiring deposits or collateral, or other terms that
allow the lender to make a higher or faster profit.51
Lenders have historically employed a number of various scoring systems in
order to quantify risk, predict the future, and identify the consumers who are
most and least likely to repay their debt.52 Consumers who are low-income or
people of color have invariably borne the brunt of these risk-assessment practices, consistently being rated as undesirable or less desirable.53 This is sometimes a function of reduced access to collateral or funding for a down payment.
When the consumer has fewer resources available to repay the loan, the lender is
forced to accept a greater level of risk. However, this disparity has often been a
direct result of lenders’ intentional discrimination against and exploitation of

49. Johnson, Pasquale, & Chapman, supra note 45, at 500 (citing OECD, FINANCIAL
MARKETS, INSURANCE AND PENSIONS: DIGITALIZATION AND FINANCE 10-13 (2018),
https://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/Financial-markets-insurance-pensions-digitalisation-and-finance.pdf).
50. I consider insurers analogous to financers and include them under the umbrella of
“lenders” throughout this Article for the purposes of this analysis. Where it is necessary to
refer specifically to entities engaged in the business of entering loan contracts, I will refer to
“financers.”
51. See, e.g., Megan DeMatteo, Elizabeth Gravier, & Alexandria White, The Beginner’s
Guide to Credit Scores: How to Understand and Improve Your Credit Score, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/select/guide/credit-scores-for-beginners/#what-are-the-factors-thatmake-up-your-credit-score (Jan. 14, 2022); Daniel Kurt, The Side Effects of Bad Credit,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 11, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/the-side-effects-of-bad-credit4769783.
52. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 1213 (Aug. 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf.
53. See generally Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV.
1071, 1095–1106 (2017).
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consumers who have limited choices.54 As a result, these consumers are frequently unable to access loans and other economic tools, or are only able to obtain them at a considerable premium.55
This in turn leads to a reinforcement of race and class subordination:56 When
minority and low-income consumers are barred from accessing critical economic
tools, their economic mobility is stalled, solidifying structural racism and
classism. Meanwhile, their richer and whiter counterparts, who can collect these
tools more easily, are able to continue advancing economically without impediment.57
Fintech and traditional consumer scoring are similar processes based on the
same principle. The major difference is that fintech uses a more expansive set of
criteria and datasets than traditional scoring has historically had at its disposal.
In the age of Big Data, sophisticated corporate data brokers are able to compile
incomprehensibly massive datasets from innumerable sources and deliver complex analytics tools to lenders quickly and easily. Data brokers can access detailed information about consumer behavior—including where we are shopping,
what we are buying, what we are posting on social media, and more.58 This
wealth of data, when run through intricate predictive algorithms, can reveal correlations and trends far more nuanced than those a human analyst could pinpoint.

54. Id. at 1096-97. For example, Ta-Nehisi Coates relates the story of Clyde Ross, a
World War II veteran who, unable to access a home loan through traditional channels, fell
prey to unethical loan scammers. Mr. Ross’ only option was to purchase his home “on contract,” a particularly vicious structure in which the seller delegates all responsibilities and burdens to the buyer, while retaining all the equity until the loan is fully paid off. Under these
arrangements, sellers could change or add to the contract terms at-will, knowing that the buyers had no recourse to seek relief in the courts. Mr. Ross’ story is far from unique. Ta-Nehisi
Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631.
55. See Freeman, supra note 53, at 1098-99.
56. Continual references to statuses of race and class in tandem throughout the Article
are not meant to conflate the two. Although there is overlap between people of color and the
poor, they are not one and the same; although there are clear similarities among their experiences and the ways in which more dominant demographics subordinate them, those experiences and subordination methods are not uniformly equivalent, and my intent is not to suggest
that they are. The experiences of a poor white person and an affluent person of color can be
widely divergent, though they are both targets for discrimination. Moreover, individuals belonging to both subordinated groups can observe a compounding effect as a result of differences between the two experiences of discrimination. These ideas will be explored further later
in the Article.
57. This is particularly striking with regard to race; here, the existing disadvantages associated with Blackness or other minority status are increased, while the benefit of whiteness
bestows additional advantage. See Freeman, supra note 53, at 1098-99; see also Cheryl Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1758 (1993).
58. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 47, at 151-52, 204, 213.
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B. The importance of auto access and fintech’s unique threat
In theory, the advent of fintech should be a positive development. Proponents may argue that it increases the accuracy of credit-scoring and gives a leg
up to individual consumers who have not had access to traditional forms of
credit.59
Instead of relying on imprecise assessment criteria like ZIP codes—which
can include thousands of people who behave very differently from one another—
lenders can make assessments based on a host of minute actions and decisions
by an individual consumer, all processed through a state-of-the-art algorithm capable of making hairline distinctions.60 Moreover, the algorithm is supposed to
be free from the implicit biases of human decision-makers which have hindered
the full economic participation of minoritized and historically disadvantaged
populations. In theory, this process is not only more accurate, but also more fair.
If true, this would have been a welcome development, particularly in the
context of auto financing and insurance—the industries to which DRN markets
its ALPR-based analytics tool. If the theory of algorithmic equity had born out,
it would have unlocked access to a critical economic tool which has long been
disproportionately—and often intentionally—denied to members of subordinated race- and income-based classes. It would have leveled an extremely highstakes playing field. In order to assess fintech’s potential for success, we must
first examine the stakes and abuses at issue.
The stakes are indeed high; involuntary carlessness is an economically dire
condition disproportionately suffered by people of color and those with low incomes. Cars have become ubiquitous throughout the United States, and driving
is a regular and expected part of life. As early as 1977, the Supreme Court described car ownership as “a virtual necessity for most Americans.”61 Ninety-one
percent of households have cars.62 As cars became more common, various aspects of society rearranged themselves to accommodate cars and drivers. Zoning
laws that favor single-family housing developments, divide commercial from
residential areas, and dictate minimum lot sizes all disrupt walkability and reflect
the shift away from walking as a primary means of transportation.63 Other laws

59. See id. at 163, 155.
60. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the Profile?: Thoughts on Race, Class,

Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 877, 879, 887 (2006) (noting that a metropolitan area can contain consumers of different racial and class backgrounds with different
preferences). Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 47, at 157, 163-65.
61. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
62. Fed. Highway Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Popular Household Statistics: Number
of Households by Household Income, NAT’L HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURV.,
https://nhts.ornl.gov/households (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
63. See Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 544
(2020).
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that mandate parking quotas64 and offer subsidies for out-of-town commuters65
also demonstrate the pervasive expectation that most Americans will drive to
wherever they need to go.
This shift has been coupled with a campaign of disinvestment in public
transit. Once upon a time, public transit options, such as streetcars, were affordable and widely used.66 Such modes of transit fell out of favor as individual car
ownership became more accessible.67 This shift was hastened by de facto municipal abandonment of these transportation systems. Notably, “[h]ighway funding
has historically been built into state and federal budgets, but transit funding usually requires a vote to raise taxes, creating what experts call a systemic bias toward cars over trains and buses.”68 Cash-strapped cities balanced their budgets
by raising fares, reducing service, and deferring needed maintenance.69 As public
transit infrastructure has deteriorated, public transportation has presented a slow
and unreliable option compared to driving.70 Even New York, boasting the coun-

64. Gregory H. Shill, Americans Shouldn’t Have to Drive, but the Law Insists on It: The
Automobile Took Over Because the Legal System Helped Squeeze Out the Alternatives,
ATLANTIC (July 9, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/car-crashes-arent-always-unavoidable/592447.
65. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-B (2021), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO
FRINGE BENEFITS, https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15b (last updated Feb. 5, 2021).
66. Cliff Slater, General Motors and the Demise of Streetcars, 51 TRANSP. Q. 45, 48
(1997).
67. DAVID W. JONES, MASS MOTORIZATION + MASS TRANSIT: AN AMERICAN HISTORY
AND POLICY ANALYSIS 1-2 (2008). Some have speculated that a campaign by General Motors
to promote its cars to individual consumers contributed significantly to this. See David J. St.
Clair, The Motorization and Decline of Urban Public Transit, 1935-1950, 41 J. ECON. HIST.
579, 580-81, 600 (1981).
68. Hiroko Tabuchi, How the Koch Brothers are Killing Public Transit Projects Around
the Country, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/climate/koch-brothers-public-transit.html.
69. See Jonathan English, Why Did America Give Up on Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame
Cars.), BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018, 11:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-31/why-is-american-mass-transit-so-bad-it-s-a-long-story;
WILLIAM J. MALLETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45144, TRENDS IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
RIDERSHIP:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
FEDERAL
POLICY
5,
8-9
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45144.pdf; Cyrus Moulton, WRTA Votes to Raise Fares, Cut
Service to Balance Budget, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Apr. 20, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://www.telegram.com/story/news/local/worcester/2017/04/20/wrta-votes-to-raise-fares-cut-service-tobalance-budget/21313469007/; Andrew Bowen, MTS Raising Fares To Close $10M Budget
Shortfall, KPBS (Aug. 20, 2019, 8:28 AM), https://www.kpbs.org/news/quality-oflife/2019/08/20/mts-raising-fares-sept-1-effort-close-budget-defic.
70. Joseph Stromberg, The Real Reason American Public Transportation is Such a Disaster, VOX (Aug. 10, 2015, 5:49 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/8/10/9118199/public-transportation-subway-buses. Americans see public transport as a social welfare program, so in
most cities it is limited, underfunded, runs infrequently, and is primarily used by those with
no other option—those too poor to own cars. Id.
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try’s largest and most-used transit system, has not been immune to these problems, with service delays and outages becoming increasingly common.71 As a
result, ridership recently declined slightly for the first time in decades.72
Due to the decay of the public transit system, even many low-income families keep an automobile. A recent report concludes that:
Most American carlessness appears to be involuntary: carless households often live in places where walking and transit use are difficult,
which suggests that absence of a vehicle is a constraint rather than a
choice. The value of cars to low-income people is also evidenced by
how eagerly the poor acquire them. Low-income households often
convert even small increases in spending power—such as increases in
the minimum wage—into vehicle purchases.73
The urgency of car ownership is illustrated by the fact that drivers prioritize
staying current on car payments above other bills. When money is tight, consumers will skip paying the mortgage and credit cards before they will default on
their car payments.74 This indicates that consumers see the car payment as a more
critical expense.
Drivers in financial distress likely prioritize car-related expenses because
they are afraid that losing their car would threaten their livelihood and push them
(further) into poverty.75 Recent research underscores the ongoing, perhaps deepening, correlation between poverty and lack of automobile access.76

71. Brian M. Rosenthal et al., How Politics and Bad Decisions Starved New York’s Subways, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/nyregion/newyork-subway-system-failure-delays.html.
72. Marc Santora, Subway Ridership Falls as M.T.A. Scrambles to Improve Service,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/nyregion/subway-ridership-falls-as-mta-scrambles-to-improve-service.html?module=inline; Emma G. Fitzsimmons et al., Every New York City Subway Line is Getting Worse: Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/28/nyregion/subway-delaysovercrowding.html.
73. David A. King, Michael J. Smart, & Michael Manville, The Poverty of the Carless:
Toward Universal Auto Access, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH., Feb. 2019, at 8.
74. Ben McLannahan, Debt Pile-Up in US Car Market Sparks Subprime Fear, FIN.
TIMES
(May 30,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/bab49198-3f98-11e7-9d5625f963e998b2.
75. Id.
76. King, Smart, & Manville, supra note 73, at 8 (“Between 2001 and 2015, this gulf [in
income growth between families with cars and those without cars] widened even as income
growth among families with cars slowed. The income increases of families with cars now
averaged only 1 percent every two years, but families without cars saw average biennial declines of about 7 percent.”); id. at 9 (“[W]here in 1955 the 75 percent of bottom-decile households without an automobile accounted for 25 percent of the nation’s carless households; by
2013, the 45 percent of bottom decile households without an automobile—who were less than
5 percent of U.S. households—accounted for 41 percent of American carlessness.”); id. at 7
(“[L]ow income might explain both the lack of cars and the lack of bank accounts. Even within
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Labor suburbanization is at least partially responsible for this trend. Unskilled jobs that would otherwise be accessible for workers with lower levels of
educational attainment are moving progressively farther from where those workers actually live. The Brookings Institution recently reported that:
Almost every major metro area saw the balance of employment shift
away from downtown during the 2000s. By the end of the decade 43
percent of jobs in the nation’s largest metro areas were located more
than 10 miles from downtown—nearly twice the share of jobs located
within three miles of a central business district (23 percent). The manufacturing, construction, and retail services industries were among the
most suburbanized, with the majority of jobs in each industry located
more than 10 miles away from downtown.77
Black and Brown populations, who are overrepresented in these industries,
are disproportionately hurt by job sprawl. As of 2017, roughly a quarter of the
Black (25%) and Hispanic/Latinx (26%) workforce was employed in the service
industry, compared to sixteen percent of white workers.78 Similarly, more Black
(16%) and Hispanic/Latinx (16%) workers were employed in the production,
transportation, and material moving industries, compared to eleven percent of
white workers.79 Additionally, sixteen percent of Hispanic/Latinx workers were
employed in the natural resources, construction, and maintenance industries,
compared to ten percent of white workers.80 Conversely, thirty-nine percent of
white workers were in management, professional, or related roles, compared to
twenty-one percent of Hispanic/Latinx workers and thirty percent of Black workers.81 If fintech were to expand auto access among these groups, urbanized workers would be able to commute to suburban workplaces more quickly and easily.

the bottom [income] decile, however, being unbanked is associated with carlessness. Thirtyeight percent of bottom decile households with checking accounts did not have a vehicle, compared with 59 percent of unbanked bottom decile households.”). This commentator and others
also suggest that the carless are punished in other ways and locked out of other aspects of
public life. Shill, supra note 63, at 500-01. Here, we are focused on poverty, so the discussion
is necessarily limited to access to jobs.
77. Elizabeth Kneebone, The Changing Geography of US Poverty, BROOKINGS (Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-changing-geography-of-us-poverty/; see
also Elizabeth Kneebone & Natalie Holmes, The Growing Distance Between People and Jobs
in Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-growing-distance-between-people-and-jobs-in-metropolitan-america/.
78. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., PUB. NO. 1057, LABOR FORCE
CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2014, at 4 (2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/archive/labor-force-characteristics-by-race-and-ethnicity-2014.pdf.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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And commute they must. For workers in those sectors, moving to the suburbs is becoming a less meaningful alternative due to a shortage of affordable
housing in those areas.82 This is especially true for workers of color. The Brookings Institution found that:
[T]he poor white population remains the most suburbanized among
major racial and ethnic groups: 70 percent of poor whites in the nation’s largest metro areas live in the suburbs compared to 52 percent of
poor Asians, 47 percent of poor Hispanics, and 41 percent of poor African Americans.83
Brookings has also reported that the suburbanization gap was particularly
severe for African-Americans, noting that Hispanic/Latinx populations had
greater success in making the move:
Poor whites and Latinos are more suburbanized than poor blacks in
metro areas with high job sprawl. This disparity is most marked in
metropolitan areas with higher poverty rates, indicating that in such regions, poor blacks may be less able to suburbanize in response to the
outward movement of jobs than other groups.84
Additionally, as low-skilled jobs became suburbanized, they also became
more competitive. A 2013 study indicated the industries most likely to suburbanize have also shrunk dramatically, leaving fewer jobs available for workers in

82. JOINT CTR. HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 12, 33
(2019), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019.pdf; Sarah Holder, For Low-Income
Renters, the Affordable Housing Gap Persists, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Mar. 13, 2018,
4:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-13/low-income-renters-findstubborn-affordable-housing-gap; JOINT CTR. HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL
HOUSING 21, 29 (2017), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/media/imp/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housing_2017_0.pdf; Margaret Hennessy, Suburban Housing
Costs Are Stretching Families to the Brink, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/03/suburban-housing-costs-are-stretching-families-tothe-brink.html; see Matthew Yglesias, Everything You Need to Know About the Affordable
Housing Debate, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/18076868/affordable-housing-explained (May 11, 2015, 11:43 AM EDT).
83. Kneebone, supra note 77.
84. Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Job Sprawl and the Suburbanization of Poverty,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/research/job-sprawl-and-the-suburbanization-of-poverty.
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those sectors.85 More recently, there has been some increase in suburban job concentration, but it has lagged behind job density increases in core urban areas.86
And the industries with the least overall density growth included the retail, construction, and manufacturing sectors.87 When there are a shrinking number of
unskilled jobs located far from home—and when public transportation and relocation are not realistic options—owning a car can offer a job-seeker a competitive edge.
In theory, employers should not ask applicants if they have their own cars.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has interpreted car
ownership as financial information that should not be considered in employment
decisions unless the employer can demonstrate that it will help them “accurately
identify responsible and reliable employees.”88 However, anecdotal data and the
proliferation of worker- and employer-facing websites addressing the question
suggest that employers frequently do ask applicants if they have cars (or “reliable
transportation”), and that a carless applicant is at a disadvantage compared to
applicants who drive.89 Thus, a worker’s carlessness not only makes it difficult—
if not impossible—to commute to a suburban job, but it may also prevent the
worker from landing that job in the first place.90

85. Elizabeth Kneebone, Job Sprawl Stalls: The Great Recession and Metropolitan Employment Location, BROOKINGS (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/jobsprawl-stalls-the-great-recession-and-metropolitan-employment-location (“Job losses in industries hit hardest by the [Recession] . . . helped check employment decentralization in the
late 2000s. Together, construction, manufacturing, and retail—each among the most decentralized of major industries—accounted for almost 60 percent of all job losses between 2007
and 2010.”); Kneebone & Holmes, supra note 77.
86. Chad Shearer, Jennifer S. Vey, & Joanne Kim, Where Jobs Are Concentrating and
Why It Matters to Cities and Regions, BROOKINGS (June 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019.06_Bass-Center_Geography-of-jobs-report.pdf.
87. Id. at 22.
88. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES AND
FINANCIAL INFORMATION, https://www.eeoc.gov/pre-employment-inquiries-and-financial-information (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) (emphasis omitted).
89. Caitiín Eagen, Do You Have Reliable Transportation?, BILLFOLD (June 10, 2016),
https://www.thebillfold.com/2016/06/do-you-have-reliable-transportation; Why You’re Always Asked if You Have Reliable Transportation, CAREER CONCEPTS (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.careerconceptsinc.com/2017/01/11/youre-always-asked-reliable-transportation/;
Can a Recruiter Ask a Candidate if He or She Owns a Car?, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT.,
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/cms_020894.aspx
(last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
90. Additionally, the gig economy, or the informal economy in which participants perform ad-hoc or freelance jobs under an independent contractor status, has made an impact.
These jobs almost universally require a personal vehicle, as task-based work requires fast,
reliable, and usually private transportation. Early examples of the burgeoning gig economy
were workers who served as drivers for rideshare companies Uber and Lyft, which imposed
vehicle specifications on drivers, leading to some drivers investing in new, or newer, cars in
order to be eligible to sign up. Alex Rosenblat, What Motivates Gig Economy Workers, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-motivates-gig-economy-workers.
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This is particularly concerning for people of color. Compared to poor white
people, poor people of color are moving to the suburbs at a faster rate.91 People
of color are also less likely to have access to cars.92 In 2019, almost 20% of
African-Americans (and 14% of people of color generally) were carless, as opposed to 6% of white people.93 Indeed, if an employer unnecessarily considers
car ownership when making hiring decisions, that could be considered evidence
of racial discrimination due to its disparate impact upon racial minorities.94 If
fintech managed to democratize auto access, that form of discrimination would
no longer be a concern for people of color.
Lack of access to a car does not just affect employment and housing; the
carless also struggle to obtain health care and healthy food. Transportation barriers can result in deferred care, missed or rescheduled appointments, and unfilled prescriptions.95 Numerous studies suggest that patients facing these barriers are less likely to utilize healthcare and more likely to miss medical
Exact specifications appear to be location-dependent, but all appear to include maximum vehicle age limits. Vehicle Requirements: Boston, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/boston/vehicle-requirements/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2021); Vehicle Requirements, LYFT,
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115013077448-Vehicle-requirements (last visited
Feb. 10, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic saw an explosion of grocery and takeout delivery
workers for companies such as Instacart and Doordash, as well as an attendant decline in ridesharing (and a further decline in public transport) as former riders opted out to avoid the virus.
These considerations resulted in a marked increase in car sales, which may only continue as
the pandemic wears on and the gig economy reveals itself to be a long-term, if not permanent,
trend. Nitasha Tiku, Desperate Workers Rush to Delivery App Jobs to Find Low Pay and Punishing Rules, WASH. POST (May 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/23/gig-work-instacart-shipt-amazon-flex-doordash/; Kari Paul, Car Sales
Rise and Car-Share Companies Boom as Pandemic Upends Transportation, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/aug/12/car-salescovid-19-coronavirus-uber-zipcar.
91. Kneebone, supra note 77 (showing that poor people of color are suburbanizing faster
than poor white people). See also Kneebone & Holmes, supra note 77 (showing that people
of color are experiencing a greater decline in proximity to jobs than white people).
92. Car Access: Everyone Needs Reliable Transportation Access and in Most American
Communities that Means a Car, NATIONAL EQUITY ATLAS, https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Car_access#/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). Interestingly, Black people are less likely
than white people to participate in the gig economy. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Ben Gitis, & Will
Rinehart, The Gig Economy: Research and Policy Implications of Regional, Economic, and
Demographic Trends, ASPEN INST. (Jan. 2017), at 16, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Regional-and-Industry-Gig-Trends-2017.pdf. This is perhaps attributable to their relative carlessness as compared to white people.
93. Car Access, supra note 92.
94. See Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/prohibited-employment-policiespractices (last visited
Feb. 10, 2021).
95. Imran Cronk, The Transportation Barrier, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/08/the-transportation-barrier/399728/;
Samina T. Syed, Ben S. Gerber, & Lisa K. Sharp, Traveling Towards Disease: Transportation
Barriers to Health Care Access, 38 J. CMTY. HEALTH 976, 988-89 (2013). Moreover, it appears
that distance, by itself, is not a dispositive measure of the travel burden for patients seeking
health care; access to transportation, particularly private vehicle ownership, appears to be key
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appointments.96 Nutritional access studies use low vehicle access and high distance from food stores as essential indicators of a food desert.97 Carlessness has
the potential to impair access to food and healthcare, which could have disabling
or lifespan-reducing repercussions, and both factors clearly and disproportionately impact the poor and people of color.98 If fintech were successful in broadening access to cars, it would save, extend, or improve the quality of many lives.
Even as cars become increasingly necessary, affordability remains a barrier
to access. Not only are there high upfront costs to car ownership, but operating
costs are also significant. This Article focuses on auto financing and insurance,
because these are among the steepest costs associated with buying a car, and they
are largely unavoidable for most drivers.99 That leads to a stark power imbalance
between consumers and the companies providing these services. As a result, both
the auto financing and auto insurance industries are marked by long histories of
predation.100 The cost to consumers in each context is calculated by closely
to healthcare access. Id. Lack of access to transportation has also blocked many communities
of color from accessing the COVID-19 vaccine. Akilah Johnson, Lack of Health Services and
Transportation Impede Access to Vaccine in Communities of Color, WASH. POST (Feb. 13,
2021, 5:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/02/13/covid-racial-ethnicdisparities/.
96. Syed, Gerber, & Sharp, supra note 95, at 989.
97. ALANA RHONE ET AL., USDA, UNDERSTANDING LOW-INCOME AND LOW-ACCESS
CENSUS TRACTS ACROSS THE NATION: SUBNATIONAL AND SUBPOPULATION ESTIMATES OF
ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOOD 40 (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/93141/eib-209.pdf. This study examined consumers’ distance not only to the nearest
food store, but also to the third nearest, which was taken to indicate the amount of choice
available and the market competition between stores. Id. at 12.
98. Even after controlling for socioeconomic status, people of color had inferior access
to healthcare when compared with their white counterparts. Syed, Gerber, & Sharp, supra note
95, at 987-88. The USDA study found that people who were low-income, of color, or carless
were more likely to live closer to food stores than people who were white, more affluent, or
owned cars. RHONE ET AL., supra note 97, at 8. This possibly suggests that people without cars
are more limited in their residential or food choices: The carless may be forced to choose
between more desirable housing (or at least broader choice in housing) and ready access to
healthy and/or high-quality food.
99. Sebastian Blanco, Annual Cost to Own, Drive a New Vehicle Inches Toward
$10,000, Says AAA, CAR AND DRIVER (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a37422784/aaa-annual-cost-new-car-expensive/; see also CONSUMER FED’N
AM., PENALTIES FOR DRIVING WITHOUT AUTO INSURANCE BY STATE (2014), https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/140310_penaltiesfordrivingwithoutautoinsurance_cfa.pdf; Penalties for Driving
Without Car Insurance by State, KELLEY BLUE BOOK (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.kbb.com/car-advice/insurance/penalties-driving-without-car-insurance/; Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws by State, INS. INFO. INST. (July 2018),
https://www.iii.org/automobile-financial-responsibility-laws-by-state.
100. Systemic Racism in Auto Insurance Exists and Must be Addressed by Insurance
Commissioners and Lawmakers, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (June 17, 2020), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/systemic-racism-in-auto-insurance-exists-and-must-be-addressed-byinsurance-commissioners-and-lawmakers; CTR. RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE STATE OF
LENDING IN AMERICA AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. HOUSEHOLDS (2012), 71-79, https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/uploads/4-auto-loans.pdf.

2022]

DISCRIMINATION ON WHEELS

289

guarded risk assessment formulas that unjustifiably rely on factors correlated
with poverty.101 These individual price-setting formulas are unavailable for scrutiny by the general public. They are also widely known to result in disparate
outcomes, with low-income and minority drivers bearing the highest cost burden.102
Both service providers have investments to protect. The financer’s business
model depends on collecting as much interest as possible—or at least collecting
interest as reliably as possible. The insurer’s business model hinges on avoiding
claim payouts. Insurers enjoy immense power over drivers, because liability insurance is a near-universal requirement for drivers and there are severe penalties
for noncompliance.103 At the same time, the formulas insurers use to calculate
prices for this mandatory investment are generally proprietary trade secrets not
subject to public examination.104 Despite this secrecy, the demographic breakdown of insurance rates strongly suggests that the rate-setting process is tainted
by discrimination. Drivers from historically disadvantaged groups (the poor and
racial minorities) consistently pay significantly more than their whiter, richer
counterparts.105
Having accepted the necessity of owning a private automobile, the consumer
immediately faces hurdles to overcome in the upfront costs of purchasing and

101. Low-Income Drivers Looking to Increase Auto Insurance Coverage Pay a $254
Average Annual Penalty Compared with Customers Who Already Had Higher Coverage,
CONSUMER FED’N AM. (July 15, 2019), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/low-incomedrivers-looking-to-increase-auto-insurance-coverage-pay-a-254-average-annual-penaltycompared-with-customers-who-already-had-higher-coverage; see also Systemic Racism in
Auto Insurance Exists and Must be Addressed by Insurance Commissioners and Lawmakers,
supra note 100.
102. Low-Income Drivers Looking to Increase Auto Insurance Coverage Pay a $254
Average Annual Penalty Compared with Customers Who Already Had Higher Coverage, supra note 101; Systemic Racism in Auto Insurance Exists and Must be Addressed by Insurance
Commissioners and Lawmakers, supra note 100. Alexander W. Butler, Erik J. Mayer, & James
P. Weston, Racial Discrimination in the Auto Loan Market (March 31, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_mayer_racial-discrimination-in-the-auto-loan-market.pdf).
103. CONSUMER FED’N AM., supra note 99; Penalties for Driving Without Car Insurance
by State, supra note 99; Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws by State, supra note 99.
104. See, e.g., Maddy Varner & Aaron Sankin, Suckers List: How Allstate’s Secret Auto
Insurance
Algorithm
Squeezes
Big
Spenders,
MARKUP
(Feb. 25,
2020),
https://themarkup.org/allstates-algorithm/2020/02/25/car-insurance-suckers-list
105. See, e.g., Systemic Racism in Auto Insurance Exists and Must be Addressed by Insurance Commissioners and Lawmakers, supra note 100.
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insuring the car. These costs are both high and unavoidable. Auto liability insurance, on average, can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars per year,106 and almost all states require that drivers carry auto insurance.107 Penalties for noncompliance are steep.108
Additionally, drivers commonly need to finance auto purchases, even for
pre-owned cars.109 It is unusual, particularly for low-income drivers, to have the
cash upfront to cover the full cost of the car.110 This presents a challenge to purchasers as the financing costs have the potential to significantly increase the
long-term cost of the car above and beyond its sticker price.111 This landscape is
similar to the insurance landscape in that it creates a quagmire for would-be drivers—but the financing landscape is rife with even more abuses and less transparency.112 Purchasers who are able to get financing approved in advance by a private lender know what they can expect to pay before committing to buy a
particular vehicle. They have time to get multiple quotes, consider the impact of
each on their monthly budgets, and decide which, if any, of the available options
106. Costs vary widely depending on the state, ZIP code, driving history, credit score,
driver demographics (such as age, sex, marital status, and more), and level of coverage. June
Sham, Average Cost of Car Insurance in January 2022, BANKRATE (Jan. 4, 2022),
https://www.bankrate.com/insurance/car/average-cost-of-car-insurance/; Liz Knueven, Average Car Insurance Costs in 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2020, 12:22 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/average-cost-of-car-insurance. Per NerdWallet, the average
cost is $1,592, but balloons to $2,812 for a good driver with poor credit. Kayda Norman, Average Car Insurance Costs in 2021, NERDWALLET (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/insurance/car-insurance-basics/how-much-is-car-insurance. As will be shown
throughout the Article, seemingly irrelevant factors disproportionately—and drastically—impact costs, compared to risk assessment factors that appear to speak more directly to the potential risks at issue.
107. Kayda Norman, Minimum Car Insurance Requirements by State, NERDWALLET
(Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/insurance/minimum-car-insurance-requirements. Virginia allows drivers to pay a fee in lieu of carrying liability insurance; New
Hampshire does not automatically require insurance but does require drivers convicted of driving-related offenses to purchase insurance. Insurance Requirements/SR-22, supra note 21.
108. Candace Barker, Driving Without Insurance, WALLET HUB (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://wallethub.com/edu/ci/driving-without-insurance/14425.
109. Experian estimates that 85% of new car sales and 55% of used car sales are financed
with subprime borrowers (those with low income or poor credit), representing nearly 20% of
financed transactions. Melinda Zabritski, State of the Automotive Finance Market, EXPERIAN
11 (2019), https://www.experian.com/content/dam/marketing/na/automotive/quarterly-webinars/credit-trends/2019-q4-state-of-the-automotive-finance-market.pdf; Stefan Lembo Stolba,
U.S. Auto Debt Grows to Record High Despite Pandemic, EXPERIAN (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/research/auto-loan-debt-study.
110. See Zabritski, supra note 109, at 17 (finding that 80-90% of subprime borrowers
who buy a used car choose to get an auto loan); see generally Delvin Davis, Auto Loans: The
State of Lending in America & its Impact on U.S. Households, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING
63
(Dec. 2012),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/uploads/4-autoloans.pdf (discussing the vulnerability of subprime borrowers to predatory auto lending).
111. Davis, supra note 110, at 68, 74.
112. Id. at 71-74.
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are a good fit. Conversely, purchasers who arrange financing concurrently with
a sale cannot forecast their future costs with certainty until they receive the terms,
which dealers may present as exploding offers in order to put pressure on purchasers to agree to the sale immediately.113 However, purchasers with subprime
credit scores—who are often the most cost-sensitive—are those least likely to
enter a dealership with preapproved financing.114
Beyond that initial challenge, dishonesty and inequality are baked into the
on-site financing process.115 Consumers are often unaware that, despite holding
itself out as a liaison or broker for financing purposes, the dealer is almost always
the true originating lender when the financing occurs concurrently with the
sale.116 The entities the dealer refers to as “lenders” or “financers” are actually
third-party purchasers who buy the loan from the dealer.117 Although the dealer
purports to negotiate loan terms with the financers on the consumer’s behalf, in
truth, the dealer is an interested party to the transaction. It is common for dealers
to mark up interest rates so they can sell the loan to a third-party at a higher price.
They then hide the markup from the car buyers by extending the loan term so the
price increase is not felt by car purchasers—who may be more sensitive to the
car’s monthly cost than its ultimate cost.118
Other common predatory practices include pressuring the car purchaser to
agree to expensive add-on products and yo-yo sales. In the latter case, the loan
is cancelled after the purchaser takes the car home, forcing the purchaser to either
return the car or to agree to new last-minute terms (usually slanted to the dealer’s
advantage).119 These schemes most often prey upon low-income car purchasers.120 Recent commentary indicates that predatory practices in subprime auto
lending are becoming as aggressive and pervasive as the practices that precipitated the 2008 mortgage crisis.121
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 66
Id. at 76.
Id. at 71-72.
See id. at 65, 71-72.
Id. Some of these third-party purchasers may even put up the loan for immediate

resale. Id.
118. Id. at 68, 73.
119. Id. at 71-73.
120. Id. at 72.
121. See, e.g., SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF FINANCIAL
REFORM, REMARKS AT THE LEVY INSTITUTE’S 24TH ANNUAL HYMAN P. MINSKY CONFERENCE
3-4
(2015),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Unfinished_Business_20150415.pdf; see also Examining Discrimination in the Automobile Loan and Insurance Industries: Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 116th Cong. 6 (2019) (statement of R.J. Cross, Policy Analyst, Frontier Grp.). For
example, auto finance giant Santander “approved loans it expected would default at rates of
greater than 70%.” David Shepardson, Santander Agrees to $550 Million U.S. Settlement Over
Subprime Auto Loans, REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-autos-lending/santander-agrees-to-550-million-u-s-settlement-over-subprimeauto-loans-idUSKBN22V2GS. “The amount of auto debt has increased by nearly 75 percent

292

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[18:269

Although any low-income purchaser may be vulnerable to these tricks and
traps, the brunt appears to fall disproportionately upon racial minorities. Research has consistently shown that nonwhite car buyers are charged higher
sticker prices and higher interest rates for less inclusive sales packages, even
when they are more creditworthy than white purchasers.122 In 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) estimated that discriminatory auto
loan markups could cost consumers tens of millions of dollars each year.123
An investigation by a consortium of housing advocacy groups found that,
while buyers’ race and income wield undue influence on the prices they pay for
cars, seemingly much more relevant information is ignored. Namely, dealers employ credit checks inconsistently, perhaps because they are relying instead on
their own on-the-fly assumptions regarding the creditworthiness of nonwhite
purchasers.124 If credit scores are so important, why do dealers abandon them on
a whim?
In theory, this is the exact kind of harm fintech would address. If fintech
truly leveled the playing field for people of color and the poor, fintech lending
would put a stop to the unfair diversion of these large sums of money—money
which would instead remain in and strengthen low-income and minority communities going forward.

since the financial crisis, and a growing proportion it comes from lending to borrowers the
industry calls subprime, because of their low credit scores. Many are low-income workers who
don’t have access to other sources of financing.” Anjali Kamat, The Other Subprime Debt
Problem, WNYC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.wnyc.org/story/other-subprime-debtproblem/.
122. See Marissa Armas, New Report Finds That Auto Dealerships Discriminate Against
People of Color, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2018, 8:48 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/new-report-finds-auto-dealerships-discriminate-against-people-color-n837136;
Derek
Thompson, The Price Is Racist: When Minorities (and Women) Are Asked to Pay More,
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/06/the-price-isracist-when-minorities-and-women-are-asked-to-pay-more/277174/; Mayra Rodriguez Vallardes, As Auto Lending Delinquencies Rise, Discrimination Is Even More Dangerous to the
Economy, FORBES (May 1, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/05/01/as-auto-lending-delinquencies-rise-discrimination-is-even-more-dangerous-to-theeconomy/?sh=61e05d4d70e3.
123. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU TO
HOLD AUTO LENDERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR ILLEGAL, DISCRIMINATORY MARKUP (2018),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Factsheet.pdf.
124. LISA RICE & ERICH SCHWARTZ JR., NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., DISCRIMINATION WHEN
BUYING A CAR: HOW THE COLOR OF YOUR SKIN CAN AFFECT YOUR CAR-SHOPPING
EXPERIENCE 14 (2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Discrimination-When-Buying-a-Car-FINAL-1-11-2018.pdf; see also Emily Stewart, Trump Just
Scrapped Safeguards that Stop Auto Lenders from Discriminating Based on Race, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/17/17248340/congressional-review-actauto-loan-discrimination-cfpb (last updated May 21, 2018, 3:34 PM).
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II. ANALYSIS: THE CONSUMER SCORING CYCLE
As shown above, increased reliance on automated forms of decision making,
such as fintech, would ideally expand access to car ownership—a critical economic tool—for historically marginalized and disadvantaged populations. Unfortunately, reality holds out little hope for that to occur. This Part will demonstrate that algorithmic gatekeeping to auto access will only lock out people of
color and the poor.125 It will reveal that fintech is ineffective at eliminating bias
because it does not actually address the points at which bias enters the scoring
process.126 Even with the advent of fintech, bias still infects the transactions
which fintech analyzes and informs.127
Moreover, the advent of fintech does not change the fact that certain regulatory guardrails for auto consumers are missing or critically compromised. 128
Auto access gatekeeping occurs under the cover of darkness and under the supervision of competing, fickle, and often ineffectual enforcers.129 Society cannot
hope to unlock auto access to all without engaging meaningfully with these foundational flaws.
Finally, the concept of consumer scoring, particularly in the auto context, is
deeply flawed at its core. This Part will show that any decision-making process
that attempts to predict future risk for lenders based on past lending decisions
will only replicate human bias exponentially under a guise of heightened credibility. Not only that, but location-based analytics, such as the ALPR-based DRNsights, introduce an additional wrinkle. Given that residential location remains
deeply influenced by the reciprocal legacies of segregation and redlining, any
consumer scoring mechanism informed by the consumer’s location can only
serve to revive and reinforce these deliberate, systematic discriminatory practices
and their effects.
A. Entry points for discrimination and the cycle of algorithmically exacerbated
poverty
Fintech fails to democratize auto access because it does not directly address
the actual entry points for bias. It cannot hope to succeed without taking on this
task. Once breached, the entry points create a cycle of bias-building-upon-bias.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See infra Section II.A.
See id.
See id.
See infra Section II.B.
See id..
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Table 1.
The image above represents the points at which bias and discrimination enter
the lending process. In Quadrant I, a lender130 compiles the data it will use to
score the consumer. This is a significant entry point for bias, and there are two
ways in which bias manifests here. Both involve decision-making by the lender
and may be animated by the lender’s (intentional or unintentional) discrimination.
The first entry point is the criteria the lender selects as a basis for judging
which consumers are more or less risky. If structural inequality has affected how
consumers of different demographics perform with respect to particular criteria,
the data documenting that performance would reflect that bias. For example, a
lender could decide to favor consumers with bachelor’s degrees. “Consumers
with bachelor’s degrees” is a structurally biased data set because Black and
Latinx people are less likely to complete a bachelor’s degree than white people.131

130. For this purpose, “lender” also includes agents of the lender, or organizations which
compile data upon which the actual lender relies.
131. See NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT., INDICATOR 23: POSTSECONDARY GRADUATION RATES,
(2019), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/raceindicators/indicator_red.asp#:~:text=The%20150%20percent%20graduation%20rate,Black%20students%20(23%20percent).
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The second entry point is the process by which the lender collects data meeting the criteria. Data collection may be biased if the lender collects this information from a database that only compiles information from universities whose
demographics differ from national trends in some way. If a lender favoring “consumers with bachelor’s degrees” uses a database that does not collect information
from HBCUs, Black consumers would be at a significant disadvantage. Even as
lenders take purportedly democratic steps to broaden the type of data they consider, the ironic result may be the increasing variance of data collection methods
and the increased potential for systemic flaws.
In Quadrant II, the consumer score is processed.
In Quadrant III, the lender makes its decision, and, if the consumer applicant
is approved, the lender delivers the contract terms to the consumer. This process
includes two decision points: first, whether to contract with the consumer at all
versus rejecting the application outright; and second, establishing the terms of
the deal. These decision points may separately involve intentional or unintentional discrimination. For example, determining that a consumer’s score is worthy of approval is one decision. Selecting which interest rate, deposit amount, or
what other terms may apply is another set of decisions. Thus, a consumer could
receive approval, only to meet another hurdle when the lender presents its terms.
To the extent that any negotiation is possible, each offer and counteroffer represent individual decision points at which the lender could choose to treat the consumer favorably or unfavorably—all points at which bias could enter the process
or be reinforced within it.
In Quadrant IV, the loan is resolved either by repayment or by default.
The cycle repeats when the outcome from Quadrant IV is fed back into the
cycle through Quadrant I’s process of establishing scoring criteria and collecting
related data. Similarly, the terms themselves—or an outright rejection of them—
can be fed back into the cycle as those data points become part of the consumer’s
record.

296

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[18:269

1. Vicious and virtuous cycles
Far from describing isolated contract negotiations, these entry points demonstrate cycles which influence the continuing fortunes of consumer borrowers. For
minoritized or disadvantaged consumers, such as Black and Brown people and
the poor, this bias manifests as discrimination, which creates a vicious cycle of
progressively deteriorating economic status. White or affluent consumers have a
markedly different experience. In that context, bias takes the form of preference,
creating a virtuous cycle of increasingly fortified economic status. It is instructive to compare the experiences of two hypothetical consumers.

QUADRANT I.

QUADRANT IV.

QUADRANT II.

QUADRANT III

Table 2.
Pat is Black and low-income.132 Upon applying for a car loan, Pat’s lender
calculates a risk score for Pat. Discrimination first enters the process by way of
the scoring criteria the lender selects, which may be biased (Bias I-A). Perhaps
this lender considers completion of a bachelor’s degree favorably, as in the prior
example. Because people of Pat’s race and income level are less likely to complete a bachelor’s degree, Pat is already starting out at a disadvantage.133 Additionally, the lender may make biased distinctions between similar, analogous, or
132. As discussed above, this analysis is meant to cover affluent Black and Brown people, poor white people, and poor Black and Brown people. See supra note 56.
133. See NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT, supra note 131 (noting that people of color tend to
have lower attainment rates for bachelor’s degrees); NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT., YOUNG ADULT
EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES BY FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, (2019),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/tbe (finding that students from families with a
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equally relevant criteria. For example, the lender could theoretically obtain
streaming service data and make inferences about consumers’ credit risk based
on their viewing choices.134 Choosing to favor one movie or TV series over another (such as reruns of Friends versus Girlfriends) is an arguably irrelevant criterion, and is also rife with the potential for bias depending on which movies and
shows are favored or disfavored.135
There is some additional nuance136 to this entry point for bias. Even if the
type of data the lender has chosen appears demographically neutral, it may be
unevenly available. For example, the lender may choose to consider Pat’s payment history for housing costs—a common criteria in consumer scoring. Pat’s
lender might choose to raise the score for consumers who have paid their housing
costs consistently. That criteria may seem reasonable at first glance, but in fact,
it disadvantages renters, and even some homeowners. Large national mortgage
lenders typically report on-time payments from homeowners.137 Thus, such a
payment history could hurt or help a homeowner’s score, and over the course of
their mortgage, that homeowner will have hundreds of opportunities to polish
their score simply by paying their mortgage on time. On the other hand, landlords
and smaller mortgage lenders are much less likely to report on-time payments
because reporting borrowers’ payment history to credit bureaus is costly and
complicated.138 As a result, there may be no record of those payments unless
higher socioeconomic status were more likely to enroll in a postsecondary educational program).
134. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 47, at 163-67 (finding that alternative scoring
platforms consider information as wide-ranging as consumers’ retail habits, which phone apps
they’ve downloaded, how quickly they scroll through terms-of-service agreements, and their
social media footprints—including the credit scores of people in their online networks).
135. These shows were contemporaries and appealed to similar age groups, but Friends
almost exclusively featured white characters, while Girlfriends featured Black characters.
Compare Friends, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0108778/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2022, 9:01 PM) with Girlfriends, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0247102/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2022, 9:02 PM).
136. This is likely to present as a meaningless semantic difference to some. Certainly,
real-world examples can blur the lines of these concepts. In the payment history example
above, the decision to ignore rental payments when the consumer is following through is arguably a data collection decision as much as a criteria decision. The distinction will become
more apparent and meaningful in the later analysis.
137. See Karen Axelton, Why Doesn’t My Mortgage Appear on My Credit Report?,
EXPERIAN (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/why-doesnt-mymortgage-appear-on-my-credit-report/; but see Janna Herron, Do Lenders Have to Report to
Credit Bureaus?, BANKRATE (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit/lenders-report-credit-bureaus.aspx (noting that “most major banks report to all three credit bureaus” but that lenders aren’t required by law to report to credit bureaus).
138. See Lindsay Konsko, Do Banks Report My Account Information to the Credit Bureaus?, NERDWALLET (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/finance/bankscredit-bureaus-opt-out-reporting-account-information#:~:text=The%20primary%20reason%20some%20banks,account%20with%20each%20credit%20bureau; see also Erica Sandberg, Is My Rental History on My Credit Report?, EXPERIAN (July 23, 2020), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/is-my-rental-history-on-my-credit-report. It may be easier to
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there has been a default, and one advocacy group estimates that “renters are
seven times more likely to have a minimal credit history deemed unscorable by
credit bureaus compared to homeowners.”139 Therefore, for renters or homeowners who borrowed from a small lender, their payment history can only hurt
them.140 If Pat is in this situation, even decades of diligent and timely payments
will not budge their score. Lenders and credit bureaus are aware of this, and they
could choose to even the playing field by disregarding on-time mortgage payment reports they receive, thereby limiting their evaluations to more uniformly
available criteria. Both consumers are simply paying their housing costs.141 Because people of Pat’s race and class status are more likely to rent, or to borrow
from a smaller lender, their consumer scores are likely to be artificially deflated
relative to homeowners with big-bank mortgages due to the lenders’ choices.142
get a loan from a smaller institution such as a credit union, increasing Pat’s chance of success.
See Jim Akin, Can I Get a Loan from a Credit Union with Bad Credit?, EXPERIAN (Jan. 10,
2019), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/can-i-get-a-loan-from-a-credit-unionwith-bad-credit/; see also Lita Epstein, Credit Unions vs. Banks: Which One is the Best for
You?, INVESTOPEDIA (June 20, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/credit-unions-vs-banks4590218#:~:text=Credit%20unions%20typically%20offer%20lower,than%20a%20larger%20impersonal%20bank.
139. Rocio Rodarte, SB 1157 Becomes Law: California’s First-in-the-Nation Rent Reporting Bill, MISSION ASSET FUND (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.missionassetfund.org/sb-1157becomes-law-californias-first-in-the-nation-rent-reporting-bill.
140. Sandberg, supra note 138. Pat’s options for getting some acknowledgement of their
payment history are to either: 1) convince the landlord to adopt the practice of reporting the
payment to the credit bureaus every month; or 2) engage a rent-reporting service. Either way,
this comes at a cost either to the landlord or tenant. See id. This leaves tenants (who likely
have a lower income) in the unreasonable position of having to expend money, time, and/or
political capital to benefit from their on-time rental payments, or else remain at a scoring disadvantage compared to homeowners who borrowed from big lenders. See JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING (2022), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_2022.pdf (noting that despite increases in higher-income renters due to a difficult real estate market, nearly 40 percent of renter households earn
less than $30,000 per year). The question of whether, and how, to classify landlords as creditors required to automatically report on-time payments, is an important one, but outside the
scope of this Article. However, California adopted a law effective July 2021 requiring many
subsidized-housing landlords to offer tenants the option of reporting payments to credit reporting bureaus for a small monthly fee, possibly creating a model for similar action in other
states. See S.B. 1157, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB1157; see also Rodarte, supra
note 139.
141. It is arguable that mortgage payments are more relevant because the homeowner is
building equity, while the consumer who rents is not. However, to serve that rationale, the
lender should separately consider homeowner equity in an examination of the consumer applicant’s assets rather than framing only the mortgage payments as an indicator of the consumer’s track record of payment behavior. Both consumers are engaged in an ongoing contract
for payment of housing costs; there is no justification to focus singularly on the homeowner
and exclude the renter.
142. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES:
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Alternatively, a lender might require the consumer applicant to submit bank
or credit card statements over a period of time. But that would create a similar
problem. People in Pat’s demographic are less likely to have a bank account and
more likely to forgo checking accounts or credit cards in favor of cash-only transactions.143 A lender concerned with protecting its potential investment is unlikely
to go out on a limb and give Pat the benefit of the doubt. Instead, the lender is
more likely to determine that there is insufficient evidence to make a decision
and deny their application.
Consumers like this are termed “credit invisible,” meaning that the consumer
has no credit record. Consumers might also be deemed “unscorable” if they have
a credit record but it is too new or limited to generate a score.144 This is a pervasive and long-standing issue in consumer scoring.145 The CFPB reported that as
of 2010, 26 million Americans were credit invisible.146 An additional 19 million
had credit records but were considered unscorable.147 These statuses tracked
closely with race and income—with 45% of consumers in low-income neighbor-

HOMEOWNERSHIP BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (2000), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2000/dec/coh-ownershipbyrace.html; see also U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS AMONG. LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY BORROWERS AND
NEIGHBORHOODS v-viii (Mar. 2005). “[S]ome 58 percent of Black households rented their
housing in 2019, along with 52 percent of Hispanic households, 43 percent of American Indian
or Alaskan Native households, and 39 percent of Asian households. The rentership rate for
white households is far lower at just 28 percent.” JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV.,
supra note 140 at 12. “Overall, more than 17% of credit union members are Black, compared
with around 13% of bank customers.” Annie Nova & Darla Mercado, Where you Bank can
Make a Big Difference for Racial Justice, CNBC (Jul. 4, 2020, 9:45 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/04/upset-about-racial-injustice-where-you-bank-can-make-adifference.html.
143. See MARK KUTZBACH, ALICIA LLORO, JEFFREY WEINSTEIN, & KARYEN CHU, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HOW AMERICA BANKS: HOUSEHOLD USE OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
SERVICES: 2019 FDIC SURVEY 1-2, 8 (2020), https://economicinclusion.gov/downloads/2019_FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_ExecSumm.pdf. Low-income and minority
households are more likely than their richer and whiter counterparts to be unbanked. As part
of this report, the FDIC disaggregated consumers in the study among five annual income
bands: Less Than $15,000; $15,000 to $30,000; $30,000 to $50,000; $50,000 to $75,000; and
at Least $75,000. Although all race and ethnic categories saw a clear direct correlation with
income and bank use, white consumers at each income level were consistently more likely to
use banks than minorities in the next higher income band, with only one exception. Eightytwo percent of white people with an annual income of $50,000 to $75,000 used banks, which
was slightly lower than the 84% of Hispanic consumers making at least $75,000 (the highest
income level) who used banks.
144. See Jim Akin, What Does It Mean to Be Credit Invisible?, EXPERIAN (Oct. 20,
2021),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-does-being-credit-invisiblemean/; see also KENNETH P. BREVOORT, PHILIPP GRIMM, & MICHELLE KAMBARA, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES, 4 (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf.
145. Akin, supra note 144.
146. BREVOORT, GRIMM, & KAMBARA, supra note 144, at 6.
147. Id.
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hoods found to be unscored or credit invisible, as well as 28% of Black consumers and 27% of Hispanic consumers.148
Consumers in this position face significant challenges in accessing credit,
not unlike those with a demonstrably poor credit history.149 However, credit invisibles and unscored consumers are still participating in the economy; they are
just not participating in ways that lenders and most credit bureaus have chosen
to recognize. For example, Pat may be able to demonstrate a long history of
timely utility payments, but that’s not a metric the consumer score typically incorporates.150 VantageScore, a more recent entrant in the credit scoring industry,
estimates that up to 35 million consumers become scoreable when credit history
is examined on a longer timetable and when the model incorporates alternative
data such as rent and utility payments.151 Not only that, but approximately 10
million of those newly visible consumers are actually prime (highest echelon) or
near-prime credit risks according to VantageScore’s system.152
Even assuming the lender relies upon a universally available scoring metric,
the lender may collect the data related to that metric in a biased manner (Bias IB).

148. Id.
149. Some consumers worry that it is worse to have no, or minimal, credit history than

to have a marred track record. It is unclear how widely this opinion is shared, but the concept
has found enough of a toehold in conventional wisdom that a plethora of online articles counsel
consumers with respect to the issue. See No Credit vs. Bad Credit: Key Differences, CAP. ONE
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.capitalone.com/learn-grow/money-management/bad-credit-vsno-credit/; Casey Bond, Is No Credit Better than Bad Credit?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Nov. 11, 2019), https://creditcards.usnews.com/articles/is-no-credit-better-than-bad-credit;
Michelle Black & Dia Adams, Is No Credit Better Than Bad Credit?, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/credit-cards/is-no-credit-better-than-bad-credit/;
Lindsay Konsko & Bev O’Shea, No Credit vs. Bad Credit: Which Is Worse?, NERDWALLET
(Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/finance/no-credit-vs-bad-credit-difference.
150. BREVOORT, GRIMM, & KAMBARA, supra note 144, at 5.
151. Blake Ellis, Millions Without Credit Scores Not So Risky After All, CNN MONEY
(Aug. 14, 2013, 6:08 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/08/14/pf/credit-scores/index.html.
FICO scores examine revolving credit accounts over a six-month timetable compared to VantageScore’s twenty-four-month window. Id.
152. Id.
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No matter how exactly bias enters the stream at Quadrant I, it will influence
the consumer score when it is processed in Quadrant II. Then the lender, informed by the score, either denies the consumers’ application or sets the terms
of the deal in Quadrant III. Bias, often intentional, may enter at this stage as well
(Bias III-A), compounding the effect of the Quadrant I bias. Consumers with a
low score are likely to be offered less favorable contract terms, but those who
also share Pat’s race and class demographic may be further downgraded from
there, and, having few options, will be under pressure to accept.153 Once Pat enters the contract, Pat will either pay or default. It is notable that this stage is the
only one at which Pat, the individual consumer, has any control or input. However, because of the unfavorable terms imposed at Quadrant III, default is more
likely.154 It is simply more difficult to fulfill the terms of the deal. Whatever the
outcome is, the lender will document it and it will become part of the available
data for the next lender to whom Pat applies, beginning the cycle again at Quadrant I.

Table 3.
A second consumer, Chris, who is white and comparatively more affluent,
may have a very different experience than Pat. Not only is Chris free from the
race and class discrimination Pat faced throughout the above cycle, but along the
way Chris enjoys a boost as a result of preferential bias.155 In Quadrant I, the
153. See Daniel Kurt, supra note 51; Deborah Zalesne, Racial Inequality in Contracting:
Teaching Race as a Core Value, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 23, 30-34 (2013).
154. A more expensive loan will be harder to repay and thus less likely to be repaid.
155. See generally Freeman, supra note 53, at 1081-1117 (describing perks and other
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lender’s selection of scoring criteria is engineered, intentionally or inadvertently,
to favor Chris. This applies to the lender’s choice of criteria, the availability of
supporting data (Bias I-C), and the manner in which the lender collects the data
(Bias I-D). In Quadrant II, Chris’ score is processed.
In Quadrant III, the lender presents Chris with its terms. Chris is more likely
to be approved than Pat, due not only to the superior score but also possibly to
the preferential bias that benefits this consumer (Bias III-B).156 Additionally,
Chris’s terms are more likely to be favorable. The lender may offer discounts,
lower interest rates, or deposits and fee waivers that it only makes available to
top-shelf consumers whose business is sought-after by lenders.157 With such a
great deal secured, it is less likely that Chris will default in Quadrant IV. When
the cycle repeats in Quadrant I, the lender will document Chris’s excellent payment history as a guidepost for other lenders, who in turn will incorporate that
data with the rest of the data they have chosen to consider—feeding an algorithm
which continues to favor Chris.
Therefore, the two consumers have embarked on ongoing cycles, one vicious, one virtuous, that will continue to impact their economic viability for years
to come. Moreover, because these cycles occur simultaneously and on a massive
scale, the lender behaviors and choices described above contribute significantly
to the widening societal gulf between the richer, whiter “haves” and the poorer,
Browner/Blacker “have-nots.”

favorable contract terms lenders commonly make available to affluent and white consumers
in contrast to the way contracts are marketed to low-income and minoritized consumers).
156. See supra Section II.A.
157. DeMatteo, Gravier, & White, supra note 51.
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Let us return to the table we considered above, and imagine the hypothetical
consumers, Pat and Chris, are applying for auto financing or insurance from a
company that bases its decision making on DRNsights.
In Pat’s case, both aspects of Quadrant I bias, criteria and collection, are
immediately evident. The criterion of where Pat’s car (or previous car) has been
spotted is a deeply flawed basis to determine creditworthiness. As we have seen,
Pat is more likely to live in a neighborhood marked with the negative legacy of
segregation and redlining and to have connections with similarly affected communities—all of which may downgrade Pat’s rating in the analytics tool.158
Moreover, the data collection itself replicates bias by employing repossessors
who may selectively and disproportionately surveil Black, Brown, and low-income communities when collecting the ALPR data that form DRN’s vast network.159 In fact, to the extent that there may actually be more defaulted cars in
158. See Patrick Bayer, The Enduring Legacy of our Separate and Unequal Geography,
NYU FURMAN CTR. (Mar. 2017), https://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/the-enduringlegacy-of-our-separate-and-unequal-geography; Emily Badger, How Redlining’s Racist Effects Lasted for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/upshot/how-redlinings-racist-effects-lasted-for-decades.html.
159. A human repossessor may discriminate by focusing on particular neighborhoods
where, in their individual judgment, debtors are more likely to reside or visit. A repossessor
could also go to hospitals, parking garages, or large events like concerts or political rallies, to
efficiently collect large numbers of plates belonging to members of a target demographic.
Even without such a deliberate attempt to discriminate, more densely populated urbanized
areas, where people may be poorer, present a likely greater value proposition than less densely
populated suburbanized areas, which offer the repossession agent less return on investment
for their time and gas. Such a choice would still have a disparate impact not only on the poor
but racial minorities:

The geographic concentration of poverty differs sharply by race and ethnicity.
Fully 70 percent of poor blacks and 63 percent of poor Hispanics live in high-poverty neighborhoods, compared with just 35 percent of poor whites and 40 percent
of poor Asians. But the overrepresentation of various racial/ethnic groups in highpoverty tracts is not confined to the poor. Some 48 percent of all blacks and 41
percent of all Hispanics live in high-poverty neighborhoods, compared with just 16
percent of all whites and 21 percent of all Asians.
JOINT CTR. HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., supra note 82; see also Kaveh Waddell, How LicensePlate Readers Have Helped Police and Lenders Target the Poor, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-havehelped-police-and-lenders-target-the-poor/479436/?utm_cam (pointing out that repossessors
“may have an incentive to focus their time and efforts on low-income neighborhoods”); Shawn
Musgrave, A Vast Hidden Surveillance Network Runs Across America, Powered by the Repo
Industry, BETABOSTON (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/03/05/a-vasthidden-surveillance-network-runs-across-america-powered-by-the-repo-industry (reporting
that two Massachusetts companies admitted to expressly targeting low-income housing developments); Todd C. Frankel, The Surprising Return of the Repo Man, WASH. POST (May 15,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-surprising-return-of-therepo-man/2018/05/15/26fcd30e-4d5a-11e8-af46-b1d6dc0d9bfe_story.html (reporting that
one car repossessor freely admitted to targeting discount stores, calling the parking lot of the
Dollar General “the place to be”). Additionally, DRN affirmatively makes recommendations
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the overly surveilled communities, that circumstance is at least partially informed by Quadrant III bias (terms discrimination) imposed upon the consumers
in past transactions, thus in turn steering repossessors’ surveillance decisions.160
The resulting overrepresentation of these low-income and minority consumers in
the database skews the algorithmic results so the algorithm continues to reproduce these same biases. Moreover, this location-based downgrading tends to impact not only Pat’s neighbors but anyone who has contact with their community.
Anyone who volunteers, visits family, works in a supportive capacity (such as
health aides, lawyers, or social workers), or has any other reason to be present in
the downgraded neighborhood may be painted with the same discriminatory
brush.161
Additionally, to the extent that a well-intentioned lender decides to use
DRNsights in combination with one or more other consumer scoring tools, the
results will still be poisoned by previous discriminatory transactions reflected in
DRN’s network (if not also in the other tools) which will infect the cycle at Quadrant I of this transaction.
Ultimately, the resulting harm is not just that Pat pays more or is more likely
to be rejected—though that fact is unsettling on its own. In the context of car
loans, Pat is also facing a hurdle to a critical economic tool, which is higher than
that which richer and whiter consumers must navigate. As shown above, Pat’s
ability to own a car unlocks a pathway to better job opportunities, more health
care choices, more choices when shopping for groceries, increased choices of
housing, and more.162 Without a car, Pat loses all of those benefits, and additionally faces countless hours lost on slow public transit (assuming it exists in their
area and travels where they need to go) or waiting for rides. This cycle, on its
own, has the power to shut Pat out of critical economic opportunities.

to repossessors as to where they should seek defaulted cars. See Musgrave, supra (finding that
in marketing materials, DRN “suggests routes for repossession companies that focus on workplaces and commercial lots during the day and apartment complexes and residential areas at
night.”).
160. See supra Section II.A.
161. See Allen, supra note 44, at 238:
Unfortunately, like the redlined maps of the 1930s, many of the data points that algorithms use to generate credit scores have a disproportionately adverse impact on
low-income communities of color, and, in some instances, even on those who patronize establishments in those communities. For example, American Express came
under scorn when customers complained that, even though they had successfully
made credit payments, their scores were tarnished for shopping at establishments
where other patrons are considered less “creditworthy.”
162. See Nicholas J. Klein, Subsidizing Car Ownership for Low-Income Individuals and
Households, J. PLANNING EDUC. & RSCH. 1, 5-7 (2020).
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In Chris’s example, the positive bias, or preference, is again evident. Here,
because of repossessors’ surveillance choices and because of the historical biases
that inform them, Chris’s demographic would be underrepresented in DRNsights’ data set—in contrast with Pat, whose demographic is overrepresented.163
This would skew the results of the Quadrant I data compilation, and thus the
consumer score generated in Quadrant II. However, this circumstance differs
from the previous example of a consumer without a bank account suffering from
the unavailability of data establishing their credit history. By contrast, lenders
and algorithms would likely interpret Chris’s absence from the data sample as a
positive attribute, given how it would likely track with whiteness and a higher
socioeconomic status. That could be one instance in which it is better to be
“credit invisible” than otherwise.164
Again, in contrast with Pat, lenders would be more likely to offer Chris demographic premium contract terms in Quadrant III to woo their business, just as

163. See sources cited, supra note 159.
164. It may be worth wondering if this absence, or lack of absence, from data sets will

create a cultural change among lenders in which less information being available for an individual consumer becomes seen as a positive attribute. It’s most probable that that would only
occur to the extent that the data set under consideration correlates with minoritized race and
class statuses. It is also worth questioning whether, since people who are low-income or of
color are less likely to start out with cars, their absence from the data set will be interpreted in
the same way as the whiter, richer, car-owning ALPR-invisibles. Given fintech’s mission to
use many data points to render theoretically nuanced conclusions, it seems likely that a distinction would be made between consumers who are ALPR-invisible because they are carless,
and car owners who are ALPR-invisible because repossessors don’t visit their neighborhoods.
If implemented, such a practice would only underscore and deepen the discriminatory cycle
already at play.
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the repossessors would be more likely to bypass Chris’ neighborhood and stomping grounds in Quadrant I.165 Thus, Chris is less likely than Pat to default in
Quadrant IV, and that positive outcome is added to Chris’s data as the cycle renews and builds upon itself.
B. Consumer protection laws fail to solve the problem
Surely the situation is not hopeless, one may suppose. Surely there are laws
to control bias in consumer scoring. Indeed, lawmakers have made past attempts
to right the power imbalance between consumers and lenders and to outlaw unfair and deceptive lending practices.166 Those efforts produced quite a few laws
aimed at creating an equitable marketplace, but the safety net they provide is a
flimsy one. Consumer protection laws are a patchwork of federal and state
laws.167 At the federal level, the laws are enforced by several different agencies
with unclear and porous divisions of labor between them.168 The laws that would
govern Pat and Chris in this example fall under the purview of no fewer than half
a dozen federal agencies—in addition to possibly hundreds of state agencies.169
This section will review three of those laws and explain why they fall short in
practice. The statutes reviewed here are the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA, prohibiting discrimination in lending decisions), Fair Credit Reporting

165. Sources cited, supra note 159.
166. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691; 12 U.S.C. § 2901 note (report on Community Devel-

opment Lending); Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Community Developments Fact
Sheet: Community Reinvestment Act (2014); 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1). “Unfair and deceptive
lending practices” is frequently abbreviated as UDAPs. Some statutes refer to “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” (UDAAPs). See, e.g., Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts Or
Practices, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (last visited Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.fdic.gov/resources/bankers/consumer-compliance/unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices.
167. Consumer Protection Laws, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH. (June 2021),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/consumer_protection_laws.
168. See infra Section II.B.4.
169. Which federal enforcer has oversight over a given transaction often depends on
what kind of business entity is involved, as will be further explained below. See Section II.B.4.
Similarly, at the state level, attorneys general may spearhead enforcement of consumer protection laws, but states may exempt some lenders, or some transaction types, from state UDAP
laws, or classify those lenders or transactions under a different regulatory scheme. Consumer
Protection 101, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, https://www.naag.org/issues/consumer-protection/consumer-protection-101 (last visited May 6, 2022); Consumer Protection
in the States: A 50-State Evaluation of Unfair and Deceptive Practices Laws, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, https://www.nclc.org/issues/how-well-do-states-protect-consumers.html (last visited May 6, 2022); NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, STATE
INSURANCE REGULATION 2, 3, https://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_brief.pdf
(last visited May 6, 2022); Regulatory Commissions, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS, https://www.naruc.org/about-naruc/regulatory-commissions (last visited
May 6, 2022).
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Act (FCRA, increasing transparency in credit reporting), and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA, unwinding the legacy of redlining).170 Having considered
the relevant provisions of these statutes, the Article will next examine how the
various federal enforcers operate within the resulting statutory regime and point
out some of the problems they present.
1. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The ECOA171 seeks to “make . . . credit equally available to all creditworthy
customers” and remove discrimination from lending decisions.172 The statute
prohibits lending discrimination against consumers
“(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);
(2) because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or (3) because the applicant has in good faith
exercised any right under [the Consumer Credit Protection Act].”173
These restrictions apply “with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.”174 Additionally, the ECOA seeks to increase transparency by requiring the
lender to notify a consumer when it takes adverse action against them.175
Notably, the consumers who have low credit scores or low incomes may be
the consumers with the fewest options available to them and may feel pressure
to accept any terms they can get.176 This is especially true given the vital nature
of auto access as described above.
Here, the ECOA targets “creditors,” and so would only apply to auto financers, rather than insurers.177 Unique among the statutes analyzed here, the Act
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, 1681-1681x; 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908.
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1691. Regulation B 12 CFR 202.5 extended the ECOA to cover credit

scoring systems. Specifically, the regulation restricted the type of personal information lenders
could collect to assess an individual consumer’s creditworthiness. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2021).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d). “[A]dverse action means a denial or revocation of credit,
a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested. Such term does not include a refusal
to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would exceed a previously established credit limit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6).
176. See supra note 153.
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The term “creditor” means “any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the
decision to extend, renew, or continue credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e). The term “credit” means
“the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer
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prohibits discrimination against applicants who derive all or part of their income
from public assistance.178 Using ALPR to make lending decisions could potentially implicate this subsection if an applicant is rejected or downgraded because
their license plate was frequently spotted near a public housing development.
Enrollment in a public housing program could arguably be considered income:
enrollees receive rental assistance, which subsidizes their income by reducing
the amount of rent they have to pay out of pocket.179 The likelihood that repossessors will disproportionately scout low-income areas theoretically allows creditors to single out those neighborhoods and label consumers as high credit risks—
possibly triggering credit denials or interest-rate hikes based merely on their
proximity to a community of people receiving public assistance.180
The ECOA evaluates violations under two theories of liability: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.181 Under a disparate treatment theory, a lender
violates the law by intentionally treating consumers differently due to certain
protected characteristics—such as race or sex.182 For example, a lender who specifically refuses to lend to women, or who singles out minority consumers for
increased fees, has violated the ECOA under a disparate treatment theory. This
type of discrimination may be difficult to prove, because lenders are unlikely to
broadcast that they are discriminating on these bases and empirical information
about individual lenders’ practices may be hard to come by.183
Under a disparate impact theory, a facially neutral lending practice can trigger liability if it disproportionately disadvantages protected consumer classes.184
In that case, the lender could defend its policy by proving that its lending practice
meets a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved by means
that result in more evenhanded outcomes.185 For example, if a lender were to
its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691a(d).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(2).
179. See Comment for 1002.2- Definitions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1002/interp-2 (last visited Feb.
27, 2022) (“The term [public assistance] includes (but is not limited to) Temporary Aid to
Needy Families, food stamps, rent and mortgage supplement or assistance programs, social
security and supplemental security income, and unemployment compensation”); HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
180. See sources cited supra note 159.
181. See Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of
Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 33 (2018).
182. Id.
183. See infra Section II.C.1 for a discussion about the lack of reporting in the financial
areas upon which this Article focuses its attention.
184. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
MANUAL
(Oct.
2012),
https://www.cfpaguide.com/portalresource/Exam%20Manual%20v%202%20-%20ECOA.pdf.
185. See id.
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refuse applicants who have had a name change in the past, or require a large
deposit for applicants who live in multigenerational households, their conduct
would likely violated the ECOA under a disparate impact theory. 186Although
these policies do not appear to target any particular class of consumers, in practice, they would disproportionately burden women and minorities. Women,
transgender, and non-binary consumers are more likely to change their names
during their lifetimes, and racially minoritized consumers are more likely to live
in multigenerational households.187
Of all the federal lending regulations designed to combat discrimination, the
ECOA provides the most robust protections for Pat. But the difficulty of proving
a discrimination claim under the ECOA presents a high bar for the consumer.188
Thus, the behavior of an intentionally discriminatory—or simply inattentive—
lender is likely to continue undeterred. Additionally, while the ECOA specifically prohibits lenders from relying on applicants’ sources of income it derives
from public assistance programs, that is the only proxy it affirmatively singles
out for prohibition based on its disparate impact.189 The Act does not go so far
as to expressly cover other proxies for protected or vulnerable classes.190 Also,
the ECOA puts the onus on the consumer to independently suspect discrimination: although lenders must give notice that they are taking adverse action, they
need only provide specific reasons for the action upon the consumer’s written
request.191 And consumers generally have no access to auto lending data that
would help their case—like data showing their individual lender disproportionately denies car loans to racial minorities.192 Even if they did have access to that
kind of data, they might not have the time or resources to parse through it.
186. Id.
187. D’Vera Cohn & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Record 64 Million Americans Live in Multi-

generational Households, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans-live-in-multigenerational-households/.
188. See Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending
Compliance: The Missing Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.,
2011-2012, at 199, 201.
189. The other protected classes relate to inherent personal characteristics, marital status,
and the good-faith exercise of Consumer Credit Protection Act rights. See generally 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691; for specific reference to income see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(2). The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau has acknowledged that public assistance income can serve as a proxy for
statuses such as disability, which other anti-discrimination laws (such as the Fair Housing Act)
may expressly protect, although the ECOA does not. CFPB Bulletin 2014-03, CONSUMER
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(Nov. 18,
2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_bulletin_disability-income.pdf.
190. For example, a high number of license plate scans at medical centers or senior communities could be a proxy for age, which is a protected class under the ECOA. However, the
Act does not spell out any other examples of proxies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d); Letter Denying Consumer Credit and Notice of Rights
under Equal Credit Opportunity Act, USLEGALFORMS.COM, https://www.uslegalforms.com/forms/us-01412bg/letter-denying-consumer-credit-and-notice-of (last visited
Feb. 27, 2022) (providing a sample notice of adverse action).
192. Taylor, supra note 189, at 201.
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2. Fair Credit Reporting Act
The FCRA193 seeks to bolster public confidence in the banking system by
increasing truth and fairness in credit reporting.194 The Act does this by ensuring
accuracy, consumer access, and due process.195 It establishes reporting periods
for many types of reportable information, excludes certain types of information
from reporting entirely, and provides a method by which consumers may dispute
information contained in their credit reports.196 However, the onus is on the consumer to review their file and dispute their credit information.197
The statute covers data broker companies such as DRN, which serve as consumer reporting agencies.198 But the statute’s usefulness in the context of systemic lending discrimination is limited, because its focus is on accuracy. It allows
individual consumers to dispute inaccurate credit information.199 But generally
speaking, it does not change the type of information being collected about a consumer and used in lending decisions.200 For example, it does not allow the consumer to argue that information was not relevant or was unfairly used to deny
them a loan; in most cases, if the information is accurate, consumers do not have
the right to dispute it.201
Further complicating the FCRA’s application is the lack of meaningful remedies for consumers against creditors who share inaccurate information with
credit reporting agencies. While consumers have a private right of action against
any FCRA violator, damages in many willful-violation cases may be capped at
$1,000.202 Additionally, a consumer cannot initiate litigation directly against a
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c, i.
See Understanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act, EXPERIAN, https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/credit-education/report-basics/fair-credit-reporting-act-fcra/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties,
and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or
furnishing consumer reports.”).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
200. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681x. In some cases, the FCRA does restrict credit
reporting agencies from furnishing consumer information—like certain medical information,
old arrest records, information resulting from identity theft, and unverified information collected from a consumer’s friends or neighbors. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(g)(1); § 1681c;
§ 1681c–2; and § 1681d(d)(4).
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681x; Is It Possible to Remove Accurate, Negative Information from my Credit Report?, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 1, 2020).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. Although FCRA provides for the payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees, which unlocks access to legal counsel, the amount of available damages may not
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creditor who furnished inaccurate information to a credit reporting bureau—unless the creditor had reasonable cause to know that it was sharing false information with credit bureaus or it failed to investigate the errors the consumer
raised.203 Because consumer-to-furnisher disputes do not always trigger an automatic reinvestigation requirement, consumers who report inaccuracies directly
to the creditor may have no recourse if the furnisher simply ignores their requests
to set the record straight.204 This is counterintuitive, as it seems reasonable that
consumers should be able to take these matters up directly with their creditors,
with whom they already likely have relationships. Not only that, but even if the
consumer were to take the error up with the agency, it would be impossible to
prove that a creditor did not reinvestigate.
C. Community Reinvestment Act
Congress passed the CRA in 1977 to combat the ongoing discriminatory
practice of redlining.205 The historical practice of redlining codified patterns of
segregation by denying credit to consumers living in Black and Brown neighborhoods.206 This practice was deeply ingrained in the credit and banking industries
provide sufficient motivation for consumers to endure the process of litigation, or for furnishers and bureaus to avoid violations. Id.
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(E) (requiring institutions that furnish credit information to credit reporting bureaus to investigate disputes from consumers regarding the accuracy of that information); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A)(specifying that “[a] person shall not
furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n-1681o (specifying that any person who willfully or negligently “fails to comply with
any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that
consumer.”).
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(A). This provision is largely in place to undergird
the FCRA’s consumer protections against credit repair companies. These entities are for-profit
businesses that claim to negotiate payment plans on behalf of the consumer. While some companies are legitimate, in many cases the company simply extracts large monthly payments
from the consumers without providing any real benefit. Credit Repair: How to Help Yourself,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 2012), https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/credit-repair-how-helpyourself. Thus, the FCRA treats disputes lodged by credit repair companies as presumptively
frivolous. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(G). The provision of s-2(a)(8) effectively prevents credit
repair scammers from hiding behind the consumer, but in the process undermines the consumer’s personal agency as well as support for consumers who have difficulty navigating the
consumer-to-bureau dispute process alone. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(B)(iv). A full analysis
of how laws should be changed to prevent exploitation while also smoothing the path for legitimate credit repair services is beyond the scope of this Article.
205. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 note (Report on Community Development Lending); OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET: COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT (2014).
206. See ERIC AVILA, THE FOLKLORE OF THE FREEWAY: RACE & REVOLT IN THE
MODERNIST CITY, loc 795 (2014) (ebook) (describing how HOLC explicitly linked the share
of Black residents to neighborhood “blight.”); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, vii, 64-65 (Liveright
Publ’g Corp. ed., 2017); LAWRENCE T. BROWN, THE BLACK BUTTERFLY: THE HARMFUL
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and widely considered legitimate.207 Redlining was even memorialized in official
maps used by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC).208 This arm of the
federal government was charged with assisting struggling homeowners and helping the country overcome the impacts of the Great Depression.209 The name “redlining” refers to the color-coded maps produced by the HOLC, which bank lenders used when reviewing mortgage applications. 210 Neighborhoods where racial
minorities lived, particularly Black communities, were coded red and thus “hazardous.”211 On those limited occasions when banks did extend mortgage loans to
applicants living in such communities, it was strictly upon the most predatory
terms.212 Ultimately, this practice systematically prevented Black consumers
from purchasing homes, making improvements to their existing homes, or relocating to integrate other neighborhoods without miring themselves in poverty or
economic stagnation.
The CRA attempts to strengthen low- and moderate-income communities
and communities of color by demanding that banks meet the credit needs of the
local communities from which they draw deposits. The law requires federal supervisory agencies to periodically assess bank branches on the basis of “the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institution.”213 Institutions that do not meet a certain threshold

POLITICS OF RACE AND SPACE IN AMERICA, 12-13, 48-49 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press ed.,
2021).
207. See Khristopher J. Brooks, Redlining’s Legacy: Maps Are Gone, but the Problem
Hasn’t
Disappeared,
CBS
NEWS
(June 12,
2020,
8:25 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/redlining-what-is-history-mike-bloomberg-comments/.
208. See Bruce Mitchell & Juan Franco, HOLC “Redlining” Maps: The Persistent Structure of Segregation and Economic Inequality, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Mar. 20,
2018), https://ncrc.org/holc/.
209. See generally id. at 3 (detailing the practices and impact of HOLC). HOLC was a
government-sponsored corporation created in 1933 by the New Deal. Id.
210. See Digit. Scholarship Lab, Introduction: Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New
Deal America, https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=5/39.1/-94.58&text=intro
(last visited Feb. 15, 2022) (providing access to redlined HOLC maps). It is critical to note
that the makers of these maps did not invent this fracturing and classification of communities.
Rather, the HOLC maps reflected and further entrenched the existing state of segregation,
which had already been in practice for many years. See id.
211. See Digit. Scholarship Lab, supra note 211; see also Mitchell & Franco, supra note
209.
212. Badger, supra note 158; see, e.g., Coates, supra note 54; see generally Mitchell &
Franco, supra note 209, at 7 (relating the HOLC’s uneven lending practices, in part pointing
out that “when conventional loans were made in HOLC red-coded ‘Hazardous’ areas, they
had higher interest rates for borrowers.”).
213. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1). The term “appropriate Federal financial supervisory
agency” means— (A) the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks and
Federal savings associations (the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); (B) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to
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of assessment may not be allowed to merge or acquire other banks—along with
other possible restrictions.214
However, these provisions were originally designed to apply to depository
banks with brick-and-mortar locations.215 Many fintech firms, on the other hand,
host their operations only online.216 Thus, the result of fintech could be, deliberately or otherwise, to sidestep some consumer protection measures in the
CRA.217 If more financial institutions run with this incentive to move into an
exclusively online model, consumers could see a snowball effect in which dwindling numbers of financial institutions are beholden to the CRA.
D. Federal regulatory enforcers
As mentioned above, several different agencies have enforcement authority
over these consumer laws, and their shared responsibilities can complicate enforcement. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Department of Justice,
and Federal Trade Commission share enforcement power over the ECOA.218 The
CFPB and Federal Trade Commission have purview over the FCRA.219 The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of the
State chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies; (C) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with respect to State chartered banks and savings banks which are not members of the
Federal Reserve System and the deposits of which are insured by the Corporation, and State
savings associations (the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). 12 USC § 2902(1).
214. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903(a), 2902(3).
215. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 1204 (proposed Jan. 9,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25, 195). GREENLINING INSTITUTE, A FAIR FINANCIAL
SYSTEM REGULATING FINTECH AND NONBANK LENDERS 10, 24 (2021). The provisions of the
CRA continually make reference to physical geography, using terms such as “branches” and
“neighborhoods.” At its inception, the CRA could not possibly contemplate online banks, and
its terms have never been broadened to include them. Bruce Mitchell & Josh Silver, Making
CRA Relevant for A Changing Financial Services Industry, NAT'L COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
COALITION (Oct. 12, 2021), https://ncrc.org/making-cra-relevant-for-a-changing-financialservices-industry.
216. See Kristin Johnson et al., supra note 45, at 513.
217. See, e.g., Letter from Robert S. Lavet, Gen. Couns., Soc. Fin., Inc., to Off. of the
Comptroller of the Currency (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervisionand-examination/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-social-finance.pdf; Matt Levin,
Banking Law Rooted in Civil Rights Era Gets a 21st Century Update, MARKETPLACE (May 5,
2022), https://www.marketplace.org/2022/05/05/banking-law-rooted-in-civil-rights-era-getsa-21st-century-update/.
218. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a(c), 1691c, 1691e(g). This authority is also shared with a host
of federal regulators charged with monitoring compliance with this law: for example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and National Credit Union Administration. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c; 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(q). Which agencies share responsibility depends on the type of financial institution at
issue. Id.
219. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s(e)(1), 1681a(w), 1681s(a). This authority is also shared with a
host of federal regulators charged with monitoring compliance with this law, depending on the
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Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) share authority over the CRA.220
Unfortunately, the agencies have also been deeply susceptible to the vicissitudes of politics. Under the Obama administration, consumer agencies prioritized
enforcement against unscrupulous auto lenders. In 2013, the CFPB issued guidance declaring that third-party auto financers who buy loans from car dealers
may be vicariously liable when dealers charge minoritized consumers higher interest rates before selling the loan to the financer.221 The guidance warned those
indirect lenders that they, having more leverage than individual consumers, bear
responsibility for policing the conduct of the dealers with whom they do business.222 Other consumer agencies also struck out against bad actors. The Department of Justice and CFPB undertook a joint enforcement action against Ally Financial Inc. and Ally Bank for charging minority borrowers higher interest rates
for their auto loans.223 That action resulted in an $98 million settlement.224 In
another joint enforcement action by the two agencies, the American Honda Finance Corporation—a third-party lender—agreed to pay $24 million in order to
settle charges that it allowed dealers to overcharge racial minorities in a discriminatory manner, in violation of the ECOA.225 It also agreed to change its practices
by taking such actions as limiting dealer discretion and monitoring dealers more
closely.226 A 2016 joint enforcement against Toyota Motor Credit Corporation
netted an almost $22 million settlement of charges that the company had allowed
dealers to discriminate in setting interest rates.227 The CFPB also took action
against Fifth Third Bank for discriminatory auto loan pricing.228 This enforcement garnered an $18 million settlement.229 Later, the CFPB took enforcement

type of financial institution at issue. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(b)(1).
220. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2905.
221. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. 2013-02, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING
AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 1-5 (2013).
222. Id.
223. Ally, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0010 (Dec. 20, 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_ally.pdf; CFPB and DOJ Order Ally to Pay $80
Million to Consumers Harmed by Discriminatory Auto Loan Pricing, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-anddoj-order-ally-to-pay-80-million-to-consumers-harmed-by-discriminatory-auto-loan-pricing/.
224. Sources cited, supra note 224.
225. Consent Ord. at 10, United States v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., No. CV 15-05264 (C.D.
Cal. July 16, 2015).
226. Id.
227. Consent Ord. at 10-11, United States v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. CV 16-725
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016).
228. In re Fifth Third Bank, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0024 (Sept. 28, 2015).
229. Consent Ord. at 12, United States v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:15-CV-626 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 28, 2015). The Department of Justice’s consent order required court approval; the
CFPB’s consent order was a public administrative settlement.
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action against two American Express subsidiaries for discriminating against consumers in U.S. territories and those with Spanish language preferences.230
However, a shift in agency leadership soon brought this vigorous enforcement to a halt. In late 2017, Richard Cordray, the founding director of the CFPB,
resigned after the recently-inaugurated President Trump joined the vigorous and
ongoing Republican effort to undermine Cordray and remove him from office.231
Trump soon installed longtime CFPB critic Mick Mulvaney as CFPB director.232
Six months later, Congress passed a resolution removing the 2013 auto loan discrimination guidance—the first administrative guidance to be discarded based
on the Government Accountability Office’s freshly issued interpretation of the
Congressional Review Act.233 Moreover, Mick Mulvaney and Kathleen Kraninger, Mulvaney’s successor, curtailed discrimination enforcement and reassured
individual financial companies that they need not worry about enforcement action against certain new products or practices.234 Ostensibly to encourage inno-

230. In re American Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0016 (Aug. 23,

2017).

231. See Morning Edition, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Chief Responds to
Republican Critics, NPR (Apr. 6. 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/06/522826544/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-chief-responds-to-republican-critics; Avie Schneider,
Richard Cordray Stepping Down as Head of U.S. Consumer Protection Agency, NPR (Nov.
15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/15/564349200/richard-cordraystepping-down-as-head-of-u-s-consumer-protection-agency; Eyder Peralta, Cooling Tensions,
Senate Confirms Cordray, NPR (Jul. 16, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2013/07/16/202644353/cooling-tensions-senate-votes-to-advance-cordray-nomination;
Paul Kane & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Reaches Tentative Deal on Filibuster Rules, WASH. POST
(Jul. 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-take-up-key-rulechanges/2013/07/16/167045da-ee1d-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html?hpid=z1.
232. Victoria Guida, Trump Taps Mulvaney to Head CFPB, Sparking Confusion Over
Agency’s
Leadership,
POLITICO
(Nov. 24,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/24/richard-cordray-successor-cfpb-leandra-english-259612.
233. Joint Resolution of May 21, 2018, Pub. L. No: 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290; Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection: Applicability of the Congressional Review Act to Bulletin on
Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/b-329129; see also
Zachary Warmbrodt, GOP Maneuver Could Roll Back Decades of Regulation, Politico
(Apr. 17, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/17/congressional-review-act-fallout-485426. This new interpretation by the Government Accountability Office
relegated guidance—that had been in force for years, oreven decades—to the scrap heap of
history by a simple majority of the houses of Congress. Id. A full examination of this strategy
is outside the scope of this Article, but it is noteworthy that the very first regulation Congress
subjected to this unprecedented procedure was a guidance designed to hold financial institutions accountable for auto loan discrimination. Id.
234. See Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (showing that the CFPB took
at least eleven enforcement actions targeting discrimination under Richard Cordray, while it
took only one such action under Mick Mulvaney and Kathleen Kraninger); Press Release:
CFPB Law Enforcement Plummets Under Trump Administration, CONSUMER FED’N OF
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vation in lending methods, the agency began sending “no-action letters” to “innovative” financial companies, assuring them that the agency had no intention of
taking enforcement action against them under the ECOA and other consumer
protection statutes.235 Interestingly, the Bureau’s first no-action letter was
granted to Upstart Network, Inc., an online loan broker experimenting with algorithmic underwriting models.236 This offer of safe harbor followed on the heels
of the Bureau’s official request for more information about how fintech works.237
Enforcement of the CRA saw a similar reversal. Consumer advocates had
long expressed concerns about lax enforcement of the Act, but generally, all
signs indicated that the Act had a positive impact in low- and moderate-income
communities.238 However, in 2020, the OCC went so far as to propose new rules

AMERICA (Mar. 11, 2019), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/16137 (“Under [the leadership of Obama-appointee Richard] Cordray, the CFPB announced 11 cases enforcing the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act producing average consumer relief over $56 million per case.
Under the Trump Administration’s leadership, the CFPB has not announced or resolved a single case alleging unlawful discrimination and has provided no restitution to any consumers”).
See, e.g., Letter from Christopher M. D’Angelo, Assoc. Dir. for Supervision, Enf’t & Fair
Lending, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Thomas P. Brown, Sec’y, Paul Hastings, LLP
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter.pdf; Letter from Paul Watkins, Assistant Dir., Office of Innovation, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, to Bank Policy Inst., LLP (May 22, 2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_bpi_no-action-letter.pdf.
235. CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to Upstart Network, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
POLICY ON NO-ACTION LETTERS, INFORMATION COLLECTION, CFPB NO. CFPB-2014-0025
(Feb. 18, 2016). The agency grants no-action letters based upon an application process by
which the applicant must describe the action it plans to take and the hypothesis it expects to
prove.
236. CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to Upstart Network, supra note 236; Eric
Blattberg, When Harvard Helps: Upstart Digs Through Your Ed Background Before Giving
You a Loan, VentureBeat (Apr. 24, 2014), https://venturebeat.com/2014/04/24/when-harvardhelps-upstart-digs-through-your-ed-background-before-giving-you-a-loan.
237. Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183 (Feb. 21, 2017).
238. Ninety-eight percent of financial institutions pass with a satisfactory or outstanding
score. Memorandum from the Majority Staff of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. to the Members
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 4 (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109303/documents/HHRG-116-BA15-20190409-SD002.pdf. Yet complaints of
unfair treatment and redlining behavior by banks remain prevalent. See Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, For People of Color, Banks are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, CTR.
FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Feb. 15, 2018), https://revealnews.org/article/for-people-ofcolor-banks-are-shutting-the-door-to-homeownership/; Over 100 Groups Call on Federal Reserve to Strengthen CRA, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://ncrc.org/over-100-groups-call-on-federal-reserve-to-strengthen-cra (applying the lens
of the COVID-19 pandemic to highlight ways to build upon the existing structure of the CRA
to reinforce its consumer protections and raise the bar for institutions regulated under it). On
the other hand, the CRA has led to positive outcomes. Lei Ding & Leonard Nakamura, “Don’t

2022]

DISCRIMINATION ON WHEELS

317

relaxing the statute’s anti-redlining provisions for the banks and savings associations it supervises.239 Consumer advocates promptly filed suit to enjoin the
agency from making the regressive rules effective.240 The next year, the OCC
issued a final rule rescinding the 2020 rule.241 It remains to be seen if the Biden
administration will further expand enforcement of the CRA, but unless lawmakers can insulate these agencies from political seesawing, there may not be cause
for sustained optimism.
C. What the laws are missing
For all the safeguards lawmakers erected to protect consumers and foster
auto access, discriminatory outcomes persist because the laws are merely circling
around two pervasive phenomena that continue to enable lending discrimination.
First, gatekeepers such as lenders and fintech purveyors, are allowed to act in
secret and dictate the terms upon which regulators or the public can access their

Know What You Got Till It’s Gone”—The Community Reinvestment Act in a Changing Financial Landscape, (Fed. Rsrv. Bank Phila., Working Paper No. 20-08, 2020), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2020/wp20-08.pdf (establishing that the
CRA has a positive effect on mortgage lending in low-income communities); Lei Ding, Hyojung Lee, & Raphael W. Bostic, Effects of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) on Small
Business Lending, FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA. 1-2 (Dec. 2018), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/community-development/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-effects-of-the-cra-on-small-business-lending.pdf (establishing that the CRA has had a
positive effect on small business lending).
239. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 1204 (proposed Jan.
9, 2020); Joint Letter: Letter Opposing OCC/FDIC Proposed Changes to Weaken the Community Reinvestment Act, AMERICANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM (Apr. 8, 2020), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2020/04/joint-letter-letter-opposing-occ-cra-proposed-changes-toweaken-the-community-reinvestment-act. The Federal Reserve also issued an Advance Notice
of proposed Rulemaking. Advocates have deemed the proposed rule to be an insufficient, but
likely positive development. Josh Silver, NCRC Initial Analysis of Federal Reserve’s ANPR
on the Community Reinvestment Act: A Step Forward but Needs to Be More Rigorous, NAT’L
CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://ncrc.org/ncrc-initial-analysis-of-federalreserves-anpr-on-the-community-reinvestment-act-a-step-forward-but-needs-to-be-more-rigorous/; Over 100 Groups Call on Federal Reserve to Strengthen CRA, supra note 239. So far,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has not taken any independent action regarding its
CRA enforcement.
240. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal.
v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 3:20-cv-04168 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2020), https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CRA-Complaint-06.25.20.pdf. As of the
time of this writing, the lawsuit had survived a motion to dismiss. Order Denying Motion to
Dismiss at 1, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 4:20cv-04186-KAW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2021/02/NCRC-et-al-v.-OCC-Ruling-1.29.211.pdf.
241. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 86 Fed. Reg. 71,328 (Dec. 15, 2021).
The new rule still does not extend CRA coverage to fintechs or online banks.
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formulas and lending data.242 Second, actuarial fairness may simply be impossible.243 Predictive algorithms replicate past choices, and location-based consumer
scoring will only reinforce the segregationist policies that established the demographic character of communities nationwide for generations.244 The following
subsection will discuss these two phenomena.
1. Transparency
As mentioned above, credit scoring, insurance, and financing formulas are
proprietary trade secrets. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, there
is no formal application process for trade secret protection, and the bar for claiming a trade secret in court is not especially high, giving lenders outsized control
in deciding who is worthy of a loan.245 Also, trade secret protection allows these
powerful companies to sidestep regulation even as they hold the economic stability of disadvantaged consumers in the balance.246 This combination of vast
power and limited review or accountability will necessarily stymie any attempts
at reform that do not tackle this transparency problem directly.
Trade secret protection is unique among categories of intellectual property.
242. See Taylor Moore, Trade Secrets and Algorithms as Barriers to Social Justice, CTR.
DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, 7-9 (2017), https://cdt.org/insights/trade-secrets-and-algorithms-as-barriers-to-social-justice/#:~:text=The%20lack%20of%20social%20balancing,and%20other%20broader%20societal%20considerations (distinguishing trade secret protection from other forms of intellectual property rights by highlighting that it is an outlier to
the underlying philosophy of intellectual property that justifies “protection for a work or invention in exchange for the public benefiting from an expanded corpus of knowledge.”).
243. Blake, supra note 16, at 1492 (arguing that actuarial methods are inherently stigmatizing).
244. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 207 at 177-93, 215-17 (summarizing the many interrelated public and private policies that contributed to the de facto residential segregation evident
in the modern day).
245. Moore, supra note 243; Brian Farkas, Trade Secret Basics FAQ, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/trade-secret-basics-faq.html#1743223 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2022). See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
DRAFT: UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, COMMENT TO SECTION 1 9-11 (1985) (explaining that
the UTSA relaxed previous requirements in the Restatement of Torts that the information be
used in the claimant’s business—under the theory that information may still be commercially
valuable even if the claimant has not yet had the opportunity to use it, or even if the information
simply eliminates a process or method from implementation).
246. Cf. Jordyn Holman, Silicon Valley Is Using Trade Secrets to Hide Its Race Problem, BQ PRIME (Feb. 15, 2019, 2:58 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/siliconvalley-is-using-trade-secrets-to-hide-its-race-problem (several tech companies claimed trade
secret protection to avoid making mandatory disclosures regarding the race and gender diversity of its employees and leadership); Marshall Zelinger, Colorado Oil and Gas Companies
Can Hide Some Chemicals Used in Fracking if They Claim ‘Trade Secrets,’ 9 NEWS (Feb. 1,
2022),
https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/next/colorado-oil-gas-companies-hidechemicals-fracking-trade-secrets/73-85e67466-e7bf-4570-adbb-6b7c5627f1ca (reporting that
an energy company claimed trade secret protection to avoid environmental scrutiny of the
chemicals it used in fracking).
FOR
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It is defined as “information,” including a formula, method, or process that “derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known to” the
public and where the owner “has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret.”247
It confers upon the claimant a broad right to shield the protected information
from the world indefinitely.248 It cannot be subpoenaed or compelled in discovery unless the court takes fairly extraordinary protection measures.249 Regulators
and law enforcement may also protect confidential trade secrets from public disclosure via record requests.250
Though trade secret protection is remarkably broad, the process of obtaining
it is astonishingly simple.251 There is no formal application process to prospectively grant, review, deny, or remove trade secret protection: hallmarks of both
trademark and patent protection.252 As long as the trade secret is commercially
valuable and non-public and the trade secret holder takes reasonable steps to
maintain its secrecy, the right remains intact.253 By contrast, applying for patent
247. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
248. Moore, supra note 243, at 6.
249. R. Mark Halligan, Identifying Trade Secrets in Litigation, But When?, REUTERS

(Dec. 21, 2021, 8:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/identifying-trade-secrets-litigation-when-2021-12-21/ (“The trade secret holder cannot be compelled to identify
the alleged trade secrets until there is a confidential protective order in place . . . It is an abuse
of discretion to compel disclosure of an alleged trade secret without granting a protective order, holding in camera hearings, sealing the record, or ordering any person in the litigation not
to disclose the alleged trade secret without prior court approval.”) In a criminal justice example, one Wisconsin defendant raised due process claims after a judge based his sentence on a
risk score as calculated by COMPAS, an algorithmic tool intended to determine a defendant’s
risk of recidivism. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the sentence over the defendant’s
argument that his sentence was lengthened based on a secret formula neither he nor the court
were permitted to inspect. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 756, 760-61, 772 (Wis.
2016), cert. denied sub nom. Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017); Frank Pasquale,
Secret Algorithms Threaten the Rule of Law, MIT TECH. REV. (June 1, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/01/151447/secret-algorithms-threaten-the-ruleof-law.
250. Christian L. Hawthorne, Tips for Protecting Your Trade Secrets When Dealing with
the Government, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/business-torts-unfair-competition/practice/2018/tips-for-protecting-yourtrade-secrets-when-dealing-with-the-government (explaining that the federal government and
most states make provisions for the government to shield trade secrets from disclosure via
public records requests); Varner & Sankin, supra note 104 (“When we asked Steve Manders,
director of insurance product review at the Georgia Department of Insurance, why his state
found Allstate’s filing to be discriminatory he refused to be more specific, claiming he was
legally obligated to protect that data from competitors and the public.”).
251. See Moore, supra note 243, at 6.
252. Id. at 2; How Long Does It Take to Register?, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(May 28, 2021, 10:23 AM ET), https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/how-long-does-ittake-register; Richard Stim, Understanding U.S. Patent Application Process, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/understanding-patent-applications-29661.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
253. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS:

320

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[18:269

protection can take years and involves supplying a detailed description of the
invention, summarizing all relevant prior inventions, and engaging in a lengthy
back-and-forth with the patent examiner.254 And although a defined characteristic of a trade secret is that its secrecy confers a commercial benefit to the rights
holder, the trade secret claimant need not show that its “secret sauce” is better
than anyone else’s, or even unique.255 Multiple parties could claim trade secret
protection over the same information, provided that they discover the information independently.256 Importantly, while abstract ideas like algorithms are
not eligible for patent protection, they are eligible for trade secret protection.257
And unlike a copyright or patent, a trade secret does not expire.258
The ability to claim such a broad legal right based largely on one’s own sayso is bizarre and unsettling in a general sense. But when powerful companies
invoke it to operate in the shadows as they dabble in the economic fortunes of
individual consumers, it can be a destructive tool.259 Every corner of the auto
access landscape is populated with these “black boxes,” and to the extent that
society has an incomplete understanding of gatekeepers’ methods, it is because
of the trade secret protection they claim and the failure of lawmakers to mandate
effective transparency. Much contemporary fintech and auto lending research is
characterized by watchdogs attempting to reverse engineer decision-making processes, or performing circumstantial investigations of proxy data points to try to
identify discriminatory decision-making.260 We have guesses and estimations,
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 3 (2016).
254. Stim, supra note 253.
255. Trade Secrets: What Is a Trade Secret?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/tradesecrets/en (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). As long as the information
was acquired independently, the holder of a trade secret “cannot stop others from using the
same technical or commercial information.” Id.
256. Frequently Asked Questions: Trade Secrets, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/tradesecrets/en/tradesecrets_faqs.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
257. Moore, supra note 243, at 6. Notably, like the legal regimes protecting copyrights
or patents, trade secret laws and commentary frequently refer to trade secret “owners” rather
than “creators.” Trade Secrets / Regulatory Data Protection, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE (Oct. 7, 2021, 1:45 PM ET), https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/trade-secret-policy; Halligan, supra note 250; Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, STANFORD LIBRARIES,
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/faqs/copyright-ownership (last visited Apr. 17, 2022);
Fred Carbone, Employee Inventors and Patent Ownership: Whose Rights Are They Anyway?,
ABA (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2020-21/march-april/employee-inventors-patent-ownership-whose-rightsare-they-anyway.
258. Trade Secrets/Regulatory Data Protection, supra note 258; Frequently Asked
Questions: Trade Secrets, supra note 257; How Long Does Copyright Protection Last?, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-duration.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2022).
259. See, e.g., Varner & Sankin, supra note 103.
260. For example, the National Fair Housing Alliance sent “secret shoppers” of different
races to car dealerships to determine if they would be treated differently (they were). RICE &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 124, at 4, 5, 12. Similarly, some advocacy groups study insurance
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but we cannot know exactly how credit reporting bureaus calculate consumer
scores, because they do not have to tell us.261 We do not know definitively how
much access people of color and the poor have to cars, because the dealers, financers, and insurers do not have to tell us.262 When the Center for Responsible
Lending published reports critical of auto dealer practices, the industry stopped
making its statistics public.263 Thus, it is impossible to study markup trends and
other abusive practices with complete accuracy.
We have accepted the lenders’ framework unquestioningly and unnecessarily.264 The result is a landscape in which profit-driven actors have broad discretion to extract income from communities that are over an economic barrel.
They can do so without publicly disclosing—or, if the machine learning has progressed far enough, possibly without fully knowing—what data they are using to
make their decisions, how they weigh it, or if there are any internal safeguards
to prevent consumer abuse.265 With respect to ALPR, it is largely unknown how
DRNsights interprets a given car’s presence at a particular concert, political
event, gun show, place of worship, or medical center and how that presence correlates with likelihood of default.266 To work toward dismantling consumer
trends by obtaining multiple quotes from different insurance companies and observing whether
and how rates change when they enter different consumer traits, like occupation, education,
housing status, zip codes. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am. Major Auto Insurers Charge Good Drivers 70% More in African American ZIP Codes than in White ZIPs,
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/major-autoinsurers-charge-good-drivers-70-more-in-african-american-zip-codes-than-in-white-zips/;
ROBYN DORSEY & MARCELINE WHITE, MD. CONSUMER RTS. COAL., TAKING THE LOW ROAD:
HOW
AUTO
INSURERS
DRIVE
UP
RATES
FOR
WOMEN
1-4
(2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b05bed59772ae16550f90de/t/5cd32d208c440400013
df9ba/1557343521887/MCRC+Auto+Insurance+Gender+Discrimination+Research.pdf;
Robert Bartlett, Adair Morse, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era, 143 J. FIN. ECON. 30, 31-32 (2022); Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson,
Lauren Kirchner, & Surya Mattu, Car Insurance Companies Charge Higher Rates in Some
Minority Neighborhoods, CONSUMER REPS. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-protection/car-insurance-companies-charge-higher-rates-in-some-minority-neighborhoods.
261. Your Credit Score: How It All Adds Up, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/your-credit-score-how-it-all-adds.
262. Indeed, the ECOA bars dealers and financers from collecting race and ethnicity
data. Thus, even powerful federal agencies are reduced to relying on proxy variables to study
these phenomena. JOHN W. VAN ALST, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., TIME TO STOP RACING CARS:
THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN BUYING AND USING A CAR 4-5 (2019).
263. Christopher Kukla, Facts are Facts: Auto Dealer Interest Rate Markups Cost Consumers, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (May 6, 2015), https://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/facts-are-facts-auto-dealer-interest-rate-markups-costcustomers.
264. See Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U.L. REV. 659, 660-65
(2018) (arguing that privately developed criminal justice technology is unnecessarily protected
by trade secret law).
265. Even if a lender understands the algorithm as originally designed, over time, machine learning processes may render the algorithm unrecognizable. Kroll et. al., supra note 44,
at 660.
266. See Risk Scoring, DRNsights, DRN, https://drndata.com/risk-scoring (last visited
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abuses and disparities in good faith, we must first dismantle the black-box structural character of auto financing and insurance.
2. Actuarial fairness
The world of consumer scoring rests on a flawed premise: that it is appropriate, fair, or even possible for lenders to use actuarial principles to manage the
risk of investment. Consumer scoring’s lopsided outcomes—and its corrosive
effect on access to vitally significant car ownership—can be traced back to the
failure of this premise. Bias is not a glitch of this landscape, but rather a feature.
Instead of alleviating the hardships bias imposes on disadvantaged consumers—
and correcting the unearned benefit it bestows on those more advantaged—
fintech only exacerbates the impact of bias. This is because predictive formulas—whether straightforward algorithms or sophisticated machine learning analytics—will usually function to replicate the past. Moreover, location-based analytics present a particular danger because of their tendency to repackage
historical practices of segregation and redlining.267
a. Past bias, future harm
Researchers Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst identify two essential concerns with algorithmically scoring individual persons: first, training data involving prior biased decisions will only train the scoring algorithm to replicate that
bias; second, training data that does not accurately represent the population will
skew the results.268 Indeed, both concepts are at play in ALPR-based algorithmic
lending, as shown in the hypothetical above.
Fintech cannot improve upon its predecessors and cure longstanding patterns
Apr. 17, 2022) (“Our Risk Scoring service provides vehicle location insights to help you understand the collectibility of your portfolio before you buy or sell.”); Rebecca Glenberg, Virginia State Police Used License Plate Readers at Political Rallies, Built Huge Database,
ACLU (Oct. 8, 2013, 5:1 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/virginia-state-police-used-license-plate-readers?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/virginia-state-police-used-license-plate-readers; Jay Stanley & Bennett
Stein, DEA Planned to Monitor Gun Show Attendees with License Plate Readers, New Emails
Reveal, ACLU (Jan. 27, 2015, 6:40 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/dea-plannedmonitor-gun-show-attendees-license-plate-readers-new-emails-reveal?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/dea-planned-monitor-gun-show-attendees-license-plate-r;
Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Defends Tactics Over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New Details on Muslim Surveillance, HUFFPOST (Feb. 24, 2012, 9:43 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997 (last updated Apr. 25,
2012). Although these sources focus on law enforcement, they still serve as examples of locations any ALPR user could choose to target for surveillance based on personal incentives and
their own guesses or assumptions about what kind of people could be found there in sufficient
quantity.
267. See Section II.C.2.a.ii.
268. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 43, at 681.

2022]

DISCRIMINATION ON WHEELS

323

of lending discrimination by following in the footsteps of past lenders and adopting the same kinds of assessment criteria. “Training data” bears that name because it is the means by which software developers train machine learning algorithms to make decisions.269 To present training data to artificial intelligence is
to declare the data legitimate, to instruct the algorithm to “do more of this,
please.” It is unreasonable to train a decision-maker by showing it countless records of biased transactions and then expect it to innovate and unlearn what it was
taught.270
Technochauvinistic logic makes it appear that data is capable of being objective and neutral. 271 However, individual humans—at least at the outset—decide what criteria to include in lending decisions, which data prove the criteria
are met, what weight to give various data points, and how to interpret them. For
example, in the case of ALPR, repossessors make choices about where to search
for cars to confiscate.272 Even when a machine learning system is employed to
make lending decisions, a human had to design the system and supply it with
training data.273 Past scoring criteria—like past contract terms or interest rates—
were repurposed from intentionally discriminatory acts, like auto dealers charging minoritized customers higher principal amounts and interest rates. When
lenders continue to use these criteria, they perpetrate (intentionally or unintentionally) the original discrimination.
Then the algorithm proceeds with its work and most likely operates without
269. See The Essential Guide to Quality Training Data for Machine Learning,
CLOUDFACTORY, https://www.cloudfactory.com/training-data-guide (last visited Feb. 28,
2022).
270. For example, consider a training data set that is made up of past transactions where
dealers routinely charged minoritized consumers more interest and majoritized consumers
less. Such a data set would train an algorithm to expect this disparity as the rule, rather than
an anomaly or undesirable act. If the algorithm is then asked to calculate what interest rate a
consumer should receive, it will replicate what it has been taught. In the criminal justice context, the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS)
algorithm, developed for the purpose of predicting recidivism, has been widely critiqued as
producing biased and inaccurate results. It analyzes a number of data points, many of which
correlate with race. See Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine
Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
271. Meredith Broussard coined the term “technochauvinism” in her book Artificial Unintelligence. It refers to the tendency of people to believe that high-tech tools or processes are
inherently more objective than their low-tech counterparts. MEREDITH BROUSSARD,
ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD 7-8 (2018).
272. Musgrave, supra note 159 (“In marketing materials, the firm has indicated that it
suggests routes for repossession companies that focus on workplaces and commercial lots during the day and apartment complexes and residential areas at night . . . Two repossession companies also told BetaBoston that they focus on low-income housing developments, since a
significant number of residents are delinquent on their car payments.”).
273. The Essential Guide to Quality Training Data for Machine Learning, supra note
270; Nick Heath, What is AI? Here’s Everything You Need to Know About Artificial Intelligence, ZDNET (July 23, 2021), https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-ai-heres-everythingyou-need-to-know-about-artificial-intelligence.
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regulatory review.274 Financers and insurers created these systems to protect their
investments, so the systems’ base agenda is to maximize profit and lock out consumers deemed to be unprofitable. When the purpose of the system is to block
certain consumers from access to an important economic tool, the presumption
among lawmakers should be that such a system is biased unless proven otherwise. Currently the presumption appears to be that the system is fair unless
proven otherwise.
As algorithmic decision-making becomes ever more ubiquitous, computer
scientists are working to advance machine learning technologies and eliminate
algorithmic bias.275 However, that enterprise is breathtakingly complex, and to
accomplish it effectively will take time, attention, and intention. Because computer scientists have not shown that they can solve the problem and (until any
solutions have been uniformly incorporated into algorithmic decision making)
AI cannot be trusted with this kind of gatekeeping function.
ii. The new digital redlining
Criteria selection is a significant entry point for discrimination in consumer
scoring. Though the potential exists for algorithms to make decisions free of human biases, certain data points—like past lending approvals and interest rates—
will always reintroduce bias if they are included in the formula. The auto financing and insurance industries have been rife with predatory and racist abuses, and
any scoring algorithm based on past auto-lending decisions would necessarily be
infected with the nefarious perspectives of bad actors.276 Because DRNsights
274. Allen, supra note 44, at 228.
275. The ImageNet project is an instructive example. ImageNet is an open-source library

of images used as a training data set to train algorithms to recognize images; programs trained
using ImageNet were found to make biased assumptions and label images with prejudiced and
derogatory terms. Researchers have been able to begin extirpating bias from the ImageNet
data set, but only by deliberately engineering the proportions of racial demographics represented and winnowing out terms that might carry positive or negative connotations. Will
Knight, AI Is Biased. Here’s How Scientists Are Trying to Fix It, WIRED (Dec. 19, 2019,
12:34 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-biased-how-scientists-trying-fix. See also Will
Douglas Heaven, How to Make a Chatbot that Isn’t Racist or Sexist, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 23,
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/23/1011116/chatbot-gpt3-openai-facebook-google-safety-fix-racist-sexist-language-ai. However, as the data set becomes less comprehensive, it is also potentially less useful. Additionally, to achieve true equity, this process
would need to be repeated with respect to every possible bias and include minoritized people
of all kinds in those processes. This element is key as majoritized people may have blind spots
with respect to loaded language. As computer science is an overwhelming homogenous field
dominated by affluent or middle-class white men, this endeavor, however well-meaning, starts
off at a significant disadvantage. See also Kristin N. Johnson, Automating the Risk of Bias, 87
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1214, 1226-28 (2019) (examining the impact of the data science industry’s “bro culture” on algorithm design and outputs).
276. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 110 (discussing the vulnerability of subprime borrowers
to predatory auto lending); Jeff Larson, Julia Angwin, Lauren Kirchner, & Surya Mattu, How
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uses ALPR location data, two additional layers of bias are likely replicated in its
scoring process. One is repossessors’ biased choices about which neighborhoods
to surveil more heavily.277 The other is the discriminatory practices that shaped
those neighborhoods—isolating the poorest, Brownest, and Blackest neighborhoods for surveillance.278
Just as the color-coded Home Owners’ Loan Corporation maps reflected and
codified the prior practice of redlining, the use of location analytics to determine
credit-worthiness similarly reflects and codifies persisting segregation.279 Although redlining was made illegal, its legacy persists today as many previously
redlined communities retain the same demographic character.280 These discriminatory practices, repeated for generations-upon-generations, have cemented the
status of a consumer’s residential location as a proxy for race.281 In theory, ALPR
data is more individualized than ZIP codes, which also tends to feed inequities
when used to make lending decisions.282 And some auto insurers offer consumers
the option to install GPS telematics surveillance on their cars, for the most individualized location analysis of all.283 But the proxy status of residential location
has been so firmly established that it cannot be undone.
As shown above, there is great value to broadening the kinds of data lenders
examine in consumer scoring decisions as a way to expand access to demographics that have historically been targets of bias, but there is no bias-free
form of location data. Any conceivable type of location data—if considered as
part of an important access decision—will inevitably reincorporate the same biases that made segregation and redlining the law of the land for so long.

We Examined Racial Discrimination in Auto Insurance Prices, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/minority-neighborhoods-higher-car-insurance-premiumsmethodology.
277. Sources cited, supra note 159.
278. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 207 at 177-93, 215-17 (providing an overview of the
practices that segregated and isolated Black and Brown communities nationwide).
279. See Section II.B.3.
280. Badger, supra note 158.
281. Id.
282. See generally Fernandez, supra note 39 (arguing that use of single ZIP code and
socioeconomic factors in setting auto insurance rates can lead to higher premiums for lowincome households, more uninsured drivers in low-income communities, and possibly race
discrimination).
283. Kristen Hall-Geisler, How Do Those Car Insurance Tracking Devices Work?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 27, 2021), https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/car-insurance/how-do-those-car-insurance-tracking-devices-work. A full examination of this technology, and the concerns it raises about the steady erosion of any remaining privacy and autonomy available to the poor (or even merely budget-conscious in this instance), is outside the
scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that the data generated in this context could
be similarly repurposed for lender use, as the DRN repurposes the repossessor data in its network.
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III. PROPOSALS
As described above, fintech is not a panacea that will democratize auto access. On the contrary, because fintech does not address the entry points for discrimination, those entry points remain open, erecting even higher barriers for
already disadvantaged consumers seeking economic justice. This Section will
provide alternative solutions which do target these entry points. These options
include: strengthening existing consumer protection laws; removing irrelevant or
derailing factors from consideration; closely examining data collection methods;
ending trade secret protection for consumer scoring models; installing a data accountability agency; and demanding that lenders accept more risk in their business models.
A. Terms/BIAS III: Strengthen enforcement of existing laws
The existing statutory scheme under the ECOA does offer some protection
against intentional discrimination, but that protection could be improved significantly. For example, lawmakers could broaden the Act to include protected classes such as disability. Disability is protected to the extent that an individual consumer receives Social Security Disability Insurance income (SSDI)—a federal
benefit covered by the ECOA’s prohibition on discriminating against applicants
who receive public assistance.284 While SSDI is reserved for people whose disability precludes them from working, about a third of people with disabilities and
of working age are part of the labor force.285 Those people may still suffer lending discrimination and should be protected. Additionally, the ECOA286 should
also be amended to include non-exhaustive lists of data points that serve as proxies for protected classes. Use of these proxies should be prohibited—or, at a minimum, should trigger some form of heightened scrutiny by the Act’s enforcers.
For example, the Act should define residential location as a discriminatory data
point that has no place in lending decisions. Also, rather than placing the onus
on the consumer to determine that discrimination took place, lenders should be
required to (1) issue reports publicly disclosing their consumer statistics and
(2) affirmatively demonstrate that their outcomes are equitable.287 A designated
agency could evaluate the reports periodically for signs of bias. Finally, the Act
284. CFPB Provides Guidance to Help Lenders Avoid Discrimination Against Consumers Receiving Disability Income, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-provides-guidance-to-help-lenders-avoid-discrimination-against-consumers-receiving-disability-income.
285. Disability Employment Statistics, OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP. POL’Y,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/odep/research/statistics (last visited Feb. 20, 2021); Disability
Benefits | How You Qualify, SSA.GOV, https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability/qualify.html
(last visited Apr. 16, 2022).
286. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.
287. See Section II.B.1.
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should be further broadened to specifically include insurers.288
Lawmakers should amend the FCRA to increase civil penalties against creditors who send incorrect information to credit bureaus.289 Additionally, Congress
should amend the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to expressly incorporate
online institutions, not just brick-and-mortar branch banks.290 Existing enforcers
should develop assessment methods to determine whether online banks and
fintech entities are investing appropriately in minoritized communities. Industry
commentators have suggested that the reinvestment criterion for a fintech company should “not be based on a branch footprint but rather a digital footprint
defined as the location of the households or businesses they deal with via the
internet.”291 This would involve setting a nationwide CRA assessment area for
fintechs, as well as a secondary assessment area comprising “any Metropolitan
Statistical Area generating 5% or more of a fintech’s business; a proportional
amount of . . . [a fintech company’s] CRA obligations would be ‘reinvested’
back into that community.”292 Such a measure, if coupled with guidelines to ensure the focus of reinvestment was on low-income and minority neighborhoods
within the defined area, would put fintechs on the same footing as traditional
banks and bring sorely-needed investment back to under-resourced communities.
As stated, the existing laws do offer some protection. Whether or not lawmakers see fit to amend them as recommended, heightened enforcement would
serve as a check on powerful lenders—at least to some extent. The convoluted
enforcement structure of the consumer protection laws is not ideal, but it does
allow for vigorous enforcement when there is a political will to act.293
In addition to federal enforcement, states may protect consumers from discriminatory auto access gatekeepers and from the violent oscillation of the national political stage.294 State enforcers are also well-positioned (and well-incentivized) to respond directly to constituent concerns.295 Indeed, the states have
significant potential to serve as laboratories for innovation. However, the black-

288. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f. The ECOA applies specifically to creditors and
credit. Credit is defined as “the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt
or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment
therefor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d).
289. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f. For information about the current civil liability scheme under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o.
290. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908.
291. Kenneth H. Thomas, Why Fintechs Should Be Held to CRA Standards, AMERICAN
BANKER (Aug. 24, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-fintechsshould-be-held-to-cra-standards.
292. Id.
293. See supra Section II.B.
294. C.f. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 758-85 (2016) (examining the enforcement powers and potential
of state attorneys general through a privacy law lens).
295. See Citron, supra note 294, at 750, 786.
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box nature of algorithmic consumer scoring in auto lending296—and the weak
public scrutiny of ALPR’s commercial uses—means that this issue is unknown
to many consumers whose rights are affected. Moreover, the necessary limitations of an incremental, likely asymmetrical state-by-state approach cannot go
unacknowledged.
B. Collection & criteria bias: Change the data included
1. BIAS I-A/C: Criteria
i. What’s location got to do with it?
Another way to democratize consumer access to automobiles and eliminate
I-A/C criteria bias is to remove irrelevant criteria from auto access decisions. For
the reasons discussed above, actuarial fairness is not possible.297 Thus, removing
proxies from these decisions will unlock access for disadvantaged consumers,
who may then use cars as a tool to bolster their economic stability.
This model is already garnering some support. Several states have enacted
statutes requiring auto insurers to remove criteria such as gender from their ratesetting formulas and focus instead on more neutral criteria like driving histories.298 Some federal initiatives to limit the criteria used in auto lending decisions
have been introduced, but they died in committee.299 Lawmakers nationwide
should demand that auto financers and insurers use nondiscriminatory standards,
placing criteria such as location firmly out of bounds for consideration. Location
will always serve as a proxy for race due to the intertwined legacies of segregation and redlining and can never realistically inform any kind of consumer scoring that purports to be equitable.300
ii. Eliminate commercial ALPR use
Lawmakers might also prohibit any commercial use of ALPR technology.
Given that profit-driven companies already possess massive data banks compris-

296. See supra Section II.C.1.
297. See supra Section II.C.2.
298. Ann Carrns, In California, Gender Can No Longer Be Considered in Setting Car

Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/yourmoney/car-insurance-gender-california.html.
299. H.R. 1756, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 3693, 116th Cong. (2019). This also lends
support to the previous proposal to increase law reform at the state level. When it comes to
removing irrelevant proxies from auto lending decisions, several states have enacted legislation, while the federal government has not been successful.
300. See Section II.B.3.
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ing billions of license plate scans, and have already shown a willingness to explore secondary markets for ALPR-based analytics, it is unreasonable to expect
that they will not conceive of more uses for ALPR.301 Beyond residential location, the amount of detailed information license plate scans can reveal about
someone raises grave concerns about its use by private corporations who are
happy to sell that location data to repossession firms, insurance companies, mortgage companies, private eyes, and more.302 It is unthinkable that this technology—and its data about which “health centers, immigration clinics, gun shops,
union halls, protests, or centers of religious worship”303 your car has been spotted
near—will not find its way into housing, employment, health insurance assessments, and more.
As a case in point, ALPR recently became available to the general public via
the smartphone application Rekor Go.304 The app appeared to be targeted to business in order to, among other things, “help schools make student pick-up lines
frictionless and more secure, facilitate parking supervision for homeowners’ associations and help streamline event parking management.”305 That said, the app
was available to all iOS and Android users.306 Not only was Rekor Go a wellplaced heir apparent to Nextdoor (notorious as a platform for neighborhood racial profiling)307, but its user-generated data including “whitelists,” “blacklists,”
and vehicle scans, seemed ripe to become the next source of Big Data mined
from smartphones en masse.308 Rekor Go no longer appears to be available on
301. Vasudha Talla, Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data from Local
Police for Deportations, ACLU (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data
(noting that private businesses, like insurance companies and parking lots, have used ALPR
technology to collect over five billion location data points); How Our Auto Recovery Network
Works, supra note 25 (marketing DRN’s network of ALPR data to auto lenders).
302. See How Our Auto Recovery Network Works, supra note 25; Joseph Cox, This Company Built a Private Surveillance Network. We Tracked Someone with It, VICE (Sept. 17, 2019,
7:45 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/ne879z/i-tracked-someone-with-license-platereaders-drn; Marnie Eisenstadt, Private Companies Know Where You’ve Been, Thanks to License Plate Cameras, SYRACUSE.COM (Jan. 25, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.syracuse.com/news/2015/01/private_companies_know_where_youve_been_thanks_to_license_plate_cameras.html.
303. Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
304. Press Release, Rekor Systems, Rekor Announces ALPR Application for Commercial Users; Puts Vehicle Recognition on Any Smart Phone (Sept. 9, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/09/09/2090793/0/en/Rekor-AnnouncesALPR-Application-for-Commercial-Users-Puts-Vehicle-Recognition-on-Any-SmartPhone.html.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Michael Harriot, The Racist Nextdoor, THE ROOT (June 28, 2019, 11:17 AM),
https://www.theroot.com/the-racist-nextdoor-1835939264.
308. See REKOR SYSTEMS, supra note 305. For a discussion of widespread data mining
via smartphone apps, see Kim Komando, How to Stop Your Smartphone From Tracking Your
Every Move, Sharing Data and Sending Ads, USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2019, 5:36 PM),
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iTunes or Google Play, but its brief stint shows that purveyors of ALPR technology will embrace any way they can use it to turn a profit.
Much commentary has focused on the Fourth Amendment concerns this
technology raises in the hands of law enforcement.309 Moreover, law enforcement officers and government officials have been known to abuse their access to
this data to stalk partners, inconvenience adversaries, and spy on unpopular or
minority groups.310 This is the case even where the data’s availability has at least
a colorable claim to being in the public interest. What is there to indicate that
purely profit-motivated corporations would do better?
2. BIAS I-B/D: Collection
As shown in the example of ALPR, data collection methods have a direct
and momentous impact on the quality of any data set. 311 In this case, repossessors’ personal and self-serving choices about when and where to collect vehicle
scans taint the DRNsights data set and contribute to solidifying the underclass
status of the poor and people of color. Lawmakers should demand that before
any system of consumer scoring or predictive analytics may be used in lending
decisions, it is subject to a thorough and independent interrogation of the collection methods that populate its data set.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/komando/2019/02/14/your-smartphonetracking-you-how-stop-sharing-data-ads/2839642002; Lori Andrews, A New Privacy Paradigm in the Age of Apps, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 421, 442 (2018) (noting that one study of
diabetes apps found that over 70% shared users’ information with third-parties). For a broader
discussion of the rise of Big Data, see generally EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, Big Data:
Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (2014), https://www.eff.org/document/2014-presidents-big-data-and-privacy-working-group-report (examining how big data will transform our
economy, our politics, and the lives of Americans).
309. See generally Stephanie Foster, Should the Use of Automated License Plate Readers
Constitute a Search After Carpenter v. United States?, 97 WASH. U.L. REV. 221 (2019) (arguing that in light of the Carpenter decision, ALPR data should be deemed a search under the
Fourth Amendment and thus should require a warrant to access); Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
310. See Daily Mail Reporter, Creepy Cop Saw Attractive Woman on the Road and
‘Looked Up Her License Plate Number So He Could Stalk Her on Facebook, DAILY MAIL
(July 24, 2012, 11:14 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2178556/Officer-Jeffrey-Tyther-used-license-plate-database-stalk-woman-Facebook.html; Jay Stanley, Christie
Use of Tollbooth Data and Why Location Privacy Must Be Protected, ACLU (Jan. 16, 2015,
11:26 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/christie-use-tollbooth-data-and-why-location-privacy-must-be-protected?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/christie-use-tollbooth-data-and-why-location-privacy-m; Paul Lewis, CCTV Aimed at
Muslim Areas in Birmingham to Be Dismantled, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2010, 4:45 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/25/birmingham-cctv-muslim-areas-surveillance.
311. See Section II.A; Why Is Data Quality Important?, LOTAME (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.lotame.com/why-is-data-quality-important/#quality; Data Collection Methods
and Why They Are Critical for Business, INSYCLE, (Feb. 18, 2021), https://blog.insycle.com/data-collection-methods.
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C. New oversight
1. Ban the black box
Consumer disparities persist in part because lenders are able to operate in
black boxes.312 To level the playing field, lawmakers should do away with trade
secret protection for consumer scoring or rate-setting formulas. At minimum,
they could create a limited class of trade secret protection which would protect
purveyors of scoring models from corporate espionage, but which would require
disclosure to regulators—who could then examine and test the models for discrimination.
2. Data accountability
Regulators should inspect and analyze scoring models to check for discrimination. Taking that concept a step further, a more complete solution would be to
design an agency charged with holding all algorithmic and machine learning decision-makers accountable to equitable principles. Such algorithms would be
subject to periodic audits to ensure that they are not disproportionately preventing economic advancement for disadvantaged consumers. This solution would
enable enforcers to proactively catch problematic algorithms and make course
corrections with widespread impact—rather than relying on individual consumers to raise complaints or causes of action. Establishing a dedicated corps of public-sector computer science experts would allow lawmakers to keep pace with
technological advancements rather than remain beholden to the expertise of the
private sector.
D. Lenders must simply accept more risk
Ultimately, the highest barrier to change is blind acceptance of the notion
that profit-driven speculators are doing society a favor by investing in loans and
insurance—and that they must be allowed to set the terms of the deal lest they
withdraw their largesse. This entrenched norm must be shattered in order to make
meaningful progress. At a certain point, lenders will simply have to accept more
risk as part of the cost of doing business.
IV. CONCLUSION
High-tech surveillance tools track and log drivers’ movements, in turn feeding the resulting data into predictive analytics tools. Auto financers and insurers
use these tools to score applicants and set insurance and interest rates. Given the
critical nature of car ownership as a lifeline to avoid poverty, this surveillance
312. See Section II.C.1.
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practice entrenches existing racial and wealth disparities. Location data is collected by profit-incentivized repossession agents, who focus their data collection
disproportionately on racial minorities and low-income communities. Including
alternative data in consumer scoring has potential to broaden access to car ownership within these demographics, but ALPR data is corrosive. Its inclusion will
only increase the barriers to car ownership. Consumer law addresses this data
brokering ineffectively, because it does not acknowledge the cyclical nature of
discrimination in consumer scoring, nor does it address the early entry points for
discrimination in that cycle. Recognizing those entry points reveals more effective solutions to the problem of discrimination in auto lending. These solutions
include: strengthening existing consumer protection laws; limiting auto lenders’
consideration of irrelevant data and proxies for disadvantaged groups; banning
auto lenders from considering location data; eliminating commercial ALPR use;
removing or limiting trade secret protection for lenders and data brokers who use
secretive algorithms to make lending decisions; creating a data accountability
agency to oversee algorithmic and machine learning lending decisions; and insisting that lenders take on a greater share of risk. These solutions will allow
lawmakers to make sincere progress at democratizing access to car ownership,
fostering prosperity, and achieving economic justice.

